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Abstract—Energy storage can play an important role in energy
management of end users. To promote an efficient utilization of
energy storage, we develop a novel business model to enable
virtual storage sharing among a group of users. Specifically,
a storage aggregator invests and operates the central physical
storage unit, by virtualizing it into separable virtual capacities
and selling to users. Each user purchases the virtual capacity, and
utilize it to reduce the energy cost. We formulate the interaction
between the aggregator and users as a two-stage optimization
problem. In Stage 1, over the investment horizon, the aggregator
determines the investment and pricing decisions. In Stage 2, in
each operational horizon, each user decides the virtual capacity
to purchase together with the operation of the virtual storage. We
characterize a stepwise form of the optimal solution of Stage-2
Problem and a piecewise linear structure of the optimal profit of
Stage-1 Problem, both with respect to the virtual capacity price.
Based on the solution structure, we design an algorithm to attain
the optimal solution of the two-stage problem. In our simulation
results, the proposed storage virtualization model can reduce the
physical energy storage investment of the aggregator by 54.3%
and reduce the users’ total costs by 34.7%, compared to the case
where users acquire their own physical storage.
Index Terms—Energy storage, storage virtualization, business
model, two-stage optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and motivation
Energy storage is becoming a crucial element to ensure
the stable and efficient operation of the new-generation of
power systems. The benefits of the energy storage at the
grid side have been well-recognized (e.g., for generation
backup, transmission support, voltage control, and frequency
regulation) [2]. Recently, there has also been an increasing
interest in leveraging energy storage for end users (e.g., by
harvesting distributed generations, and cutting electrical bill)
[2]. However, deploying energy storage at the end-user side
also faces challenges. On one hand, the current commercial
storage products for end users often have high price tags.1
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1A Tesla Powerwall storage with a capacity of 13.5 kWh costs $6200 [3].
Further, since a storage product lasts for years, it is challenging
for a user to decide the storage size due to the uncertainty
of future energy demand. In fact, the Tesla Powerwall only
provides one or two choices of storage size for users. Both
of these factors can discourage users from purchasing such
storage products and enjoying the benefits. On the other
hand, if many users invest in energy storage, it is possible
for them to cooperate and share the benefits of storage due
to complementary charge and discharge needs. The above
considerations motivate us to study the following problem in
the paper: what would be a good business model that promotes
users’ more efficient use of energy storage?
In our work, we develop a novel business model to virtualize
and allocate central energy storage resources to end users
through a pricing mechanism. This is analogous to the practice
of cloud service providers, who set prices for virtualized
computing resources shared by end users [4]. In the power
system, we can also envision that a storage aggregator invests
in a central physical storage unit and then virtualizes it into
separable virtual storage capacities that are sold to end users
at a suitable price. Users purchase the virtual storage to reduce
the energy cost.
One key advantage of our storage virtualization framework
is the ability to leverage users’ complementary charge and
discharge profiles. Note that the aggregator only cares about
the net power flowing in and out the storage. As some users
may choose to charge while others choose to discharge in the
same time slot, some requests will cancel out at the aggregated
level. This suggests that even if all the users are fully utilizing
their virtual storage capacity, it is possible to support users’
needs by using a smaller central storage comparing with the
total virtual storage capacities sold to users. Such comple-
mentary charge and discharge profiles can arise in practice
due to the diverse load and renewable generation profiles
of end users. Specifically, as the most promising sources of
clean and sustainable energy, solar and wind energy have
both been increasingly adopted by households, commercial
buildings, and residential communities [5] [6]. Studies in
[7]–[9] showed that solar and wind energy exhibit diverse
and locational-dependent generation profiles. Similarly, end
users’ load profiles can also be significantly diverse even in a
localized region [10].2
Another key advantage of storage virtualization is that a user
can flexibly change the amount of virtual capacity to purchase
over time based on his varying demand. Such flexibility is
2We show the diversity of users’ load profiles in the online Appendix O of
the technical report [11] based on the data from [10].
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2difficult to realize if the user owns physical storage by himself,
and encourages the users to take advantage of the energy
storage. The above key advantages can further increase users’
demand for the storage and reduce the aggregator’s investment
cost, which can increase the aggregator’s profit.
To rigorously study such benefits of storage virtualization, in
this paper, we consider two possible types of aggregators. The
first possibility is a profit-seeking aggregator. In a deregulated
energy market, the profit-seeking storage aggregator can de-
cide whether or not and how much storage capacity to invest
in, so as to maximize her profits. Such deregulated markets
can be found in the U.S. and many European countries, and
third parties are encouraged to participate in the market to
provide different services for the grid and end users [12] [13].
The second possibility is that the aggregator is regulated by
the system operators or regulatory agents, which may have
the goal of maximizing the benefit of end users subject to a
nonnegative profit.
B. Main results and contributions
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first work that
develops a pricing mechanism for the storage virtualization
and sharing. In such a framework, a storage aggregator invests
in a central physical storage unit and then virtualizes it into
separable virtual storage capacities that are sold to end users
at a suitable price. Users purchase the virtual storage to reduce
the energy cost.
A new question for this storage virtualization model is how
the aggregator’s investment and pricing decisions are coupled
with the users’ purchase and storage operation decisions. To
answer this question, we formulate a two-stage optimization
problem for the interactions between the aggregator and users
at two different horizons: the investment horizon divided into
many operational horizons. Over the investment horizon (e.g.,
15 years), the aggregator determines the size of the physical
storage for virtualization and the price of the virtual storage. At
the beginning of each operational horizon (e.g., one day), each
user determines the virtual capacity to purchase as well as the
charge and discharge decision. The aggregator chooses a price
of the virtual storage to balance her profit and users’ benefits.
For a profit-seeking aggregator, we aim to find the optimal-
profit price to maximize her profit. For an aggregator that is
regulated by the system operator or regulatory agents, we aim
to find the lowest-nonnegative-profit price, which can give the
most benefits to users while maintaining a nonnegative profit
for the aggregator. We demonstrate that such a virtualization
leads to more efficient use of the physical energy storage,
compared with the case where each user acquires his own
physical storage.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Storage virtualization framework: In Section II, we de-
velop a storage virtualization and sharing framework. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
develops a pricing mechanism for storage virtualization
and sharing.
• Pricing-based virtual capacity allocation: In Section III,
we formulate a two-stage optimization problem between
the aggregator and users. In Stage 1, the aggregator
determines the pricing and investment of the storage.
In Stage 2, each user decides his purchase decision and
the storage schedule. We consider two pricing strategies
for the aggregator: one maximizes the aggregator’s profit
while the other gives the highest benefits to users.
• Threshold-based search algorithm: In Section IV, we
resolve a multi-optima issue of Stage 2 by introducing
a penalty on users’ charge and discharge power. As the
penalty approaches zero, we characterize a stepwise struc-
ture of users’ optimal solutions, and show a piecewise
linear structure of the aggregator’s optimal profit with
respect to the virtual storage price. This structure then
allows us to iteratively search for near-optimal investment
and pricing strategies within an arbitrary precision.
• Realistic-data simulations: In Section V, we conduct the
simulation using realistic load data from PG&E Corpora-
tion and meteorology data from Hong Kong Observatory.
We show that our model enables the aggregator to save
the physical storage investment cost by 54.3% and the
users to reduce energy costs by 34.7%, compared with
the case where users acquire their own physical storage.
C. Related works
There have been several studies on the deployment of
energy storage at the end-user side [14]–[23]. In [14]–[17],
each user only utilizes his own energy storage units for
demand management without mutual sharing, which may lead
to inefficient use of the storage. In contrast, the works in
[18]–[20] considered user sharing of a central storage without
considering the investment issue of the central storage and the
potential impact on the users. In [21] and [22], end users share
the energy storage with a third party. However, both works
allocate the physical storage capacities (instead of virtual
capacities) to the users, which does not take advantage of the
complementariness of users’ profiles.
The work that is most closely related to ours is [23], in
which the authors proposed a business model to enable users to
share the central storage. Our work differs from [23] in several
crucial ways. First, in [23] the storage sizing decisions are not
coordinated between the storage aggregator and users. More
specifically, the aggregator needs to invest in a sufficiently
large capacity to satisfy users’ needs, which is not cost-
efficient. In contrast, in our work, the aggregator can adjust
the price of virtual storage to influence the demand of storage,
and effectively coordinate the benefit sharing of virtual storage
between the aggregator and users. Second, the model in [23]
assumes that a user’s purchased virtual storage cannot change
on a daily basis. In contrast, our model allows a user to flexibly
choose the amount of virtual storage to purchase every day,
depending on his daily renewable generation and load demand.
This additional level of flexibility further explores the potential
of storage virtualization and reduces users’ cost.
Our work models the virtual storage sharing framework as
a two-stage optimization problem. Such multi-stage problems
have been studied in smart grid systems (e.g., [7], [22], [24],
[25]). The work [22] built a two-stage optimization problem
for the sharing of a central storage unit between a distribution
3company and customers. The work [24] proposed a two-
stage model for the energy pricing and dispatch problem
of the electricity retailers. Both works [22] and [24] solved
the two-stage problem by constructing a single optimization
problem, which requires the operator to know all the users’
private information. Compared with [22] and [24] that require
complete network information, our work designs a distributed
algorithm based on the information exchange between users
and the aggregator.
The works [7] and [25] designed distributed algorithms
based on the information exchange with an aggregator to
coordinate the decisions among different users or microgrids.
Such distributed algorithms can be used to realize the concept
of transactive energy in the smart grid, which can achieve an
equilibrium by exchanging value-based information [26]. In
such a transactive energy framework, the agents of mid- or
small-sized energy resources can automatically negotiate with
each other as well as exchange information with the main grid
through advanced energy management and control system. In
our work, users can actively and automatically respond to the
price signal from the aggregator, which is supported by the
transactive energy framework. Compared with [7] and [25],
our work focuses on the pricing mechanism of the aggregator
who sells the virtual storage capacities to users and seeks
the profits, while the works [7] and [25] focused on the
coordination between users (or microgrids) under the help of
the aggregator to reach the social optima or consensus.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Figure 1 illustrates the system model, where a community
of users are connected with a central storage unit and the main
grid (and with each other) through power and communication
infrastructures.3 Each user has his load demand and may
also own some local renewables. An aggregator invests and
operates the central storage unit. Next, we introduce the
models of the users and the aggregator in more details.
A. Users
We consider a set of users I = {1, . . . , I} whose energy
load profiles can be different. Users may own renewables of
solar and wind energy. To satisfy the demand, a user can use
the locally generated renewable energy, purchase energy from
the main grid, or use the energy from the energy storage. Next,
we first introduce the user’s electricity bill, and then discuss
how storage can be used to reduce the electricity bill.
We adopt a peak-based demand charge tariff for the electric-
ity bill. Peak-based demand charge has been widely adopted
for commercial and industrial consumers in order to reduce the
system peak and recover grid costs. Thanks to the increasingly
more advanced metering infrastructure, such a demand charge
scheme has also been offered to residential customers by some
utilities in the United States [27] [28]. For a billing cycle
T = {1, 2, ..., T} of T time slots, if user i consumes electricity
3We assume that the grid constraints are not stringent, so that we can focus
on how the aggregator sets the price of the virtual storage and how storage
virtualization reduces the requirement of physical storage and the users’ costs.
We will consider the grid constraints in the future work.
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Fig. 1: System structure.
pgi [t] from the grid in time slot t, his electricity bill [29] in T
is calculated by:
pib
∑
t∈T
pgi [t] + pip max
t∈T
pgi [t], (1)
where pib is the unit energy price and pip is the unit price for
peak consumption in the billing cycle. To reduce users’ peak
demand, the utility usually sets pip much higher than pib [28].
Demand charge tariff in (1) provides a strong incentive
for users to utilize energy storage to shave their peak loads.
Specifically, users can proactively charge their storage using
energy from the grid, and discharge to meet the peak load so
as to reduce the electricity bill. Furthermore, if a user owns
the renewables, he can store excessive renewable energy in
the storage for later use. We assume that users can sell back
renewable energy to the grid and the unit feed-in price pis
satisfies pis < pib, such that users prefer to first use the locally
generated renewable energy to serve their loads rather than to
directly sell to the grid.4
B. Storage aggregator
The aggregator invests and operates the central physical
storage. She virtualizes the physical storage into separable
virtual capacities and sells them to users. Since users can’t
control the central storage directly, they report their charge
and discharge decisions to the aggregator, and the aggregator
dispatches the central storage on behalf of users accordingly.
Further, the aggregator can coordinate users’ charge and dis-
charge decisions by setting the price of virtual storage, which
will ensure that users’ charge and discharge decisions are well
accommodated by the physical storage.
We assume that there is a billing arrangement among the
utility, the storage aggregator and users such that when the
utility calculates users’ electricity bill, it will count both
the physical load and the virtual storage charge/discharge.
Thus, even though users don’t own and operate their physical
storage, users can use the virtual storage to achieve a peak
load reduction and reduce the electricity bill.
As we have discussed in Section I, our storage virtualization
model can lead to a more efficient use of physical storage
due to two reasons: (i) the complementarity of different users’
charge and discharge decisions, and (ii) the flexibility in
purchasing different amounts of virtual capacities on different
days. The aggregator’s investment in the physical storage will
take advantage of these aspects while satisfying users’ de-
mand. However, occasionally there can be very high aggregate
4It is common that the renewable feed-in tariff is lower than the consump-
tion tariff, for example, in Germany and some states of the U.S. [30].
4demand from users. Satisfying such demand with a fixed
physical storage investment will lead to low efficiency due to
either over-investment or over-pricing. Thus, we further gen-
eralize our model by allowing the aggregator to use additional
energy resources other than the physical storage to meet users’
demand. For example, the aggregator can contract with other
generators (or consumers) to purchase additional energy (or
sell surplus energy) to serve users’ demand.5
III. TWO-STAGE FORMULATION
Figure 2 illustrates two timescales of decision making in
our model. Figure 3 illustrates a two-stage problem for the
interactions between the aggregator and users. In Stage 1, at
the beginning of an investment horizon D= {1, 2, ..., D} of
D days (e.g., D corresponding to many years), the aggregator
determines the size of the physical storage and the unit price
of the virtual storage. The investment horizon is divided into
many operational horizons, i.e., each d ∈ D corresponds to
one operational horizon, which is further divided into many
time slots T ={1, 2, ..., T} (e.g., 24 time slots corresponding
to 24 hours). In Stage 2, at the beginning of each operational
horizon, given the unit price of virtual storage, each user
decides the optimal capacity to purchase and the corresponding
charge and discharge profiles over the operational horizon,
based on the prediction of their loads and renewable gen-
erations.6 Then, the aggregator operates the physical storage
by aggregating all the users’ charge and discharge decisions.
Note that we consider a daily operation of virtual storage
sharing as well as the daily demand charge tariff for users’
electricity bills, because users’ electricity loads reflect their
activities which are often periodic on a daily basis (see, e.g.,
extensive studies in [33] and [34]). Furthermore, users’ load
profiles can differ from one day to another (e.g., the differences
between weekdays and weekends). The operation and billing
cycle on a daily basis can leverage the diversity in users’ loads
and provide flexibility to users, such that users can purchase
a different amount of virtual storage on different days to
minimize their costs.
In order to solve the aggregator’s investment and pricing
problem over the investment horizon, the aggregator needs
to incorporate users’ responses across different operational
horizons in the entire investment horizon. Since users’ re-
sponses depend on different operational conditions (e.g., local
renewable generations and loads), we use historical data to
build a set of scenarios Ω that empirically models the joint
distribution of all users’ load and renewable generation pro-
files. For each operational horizon d, scenario ω ∈ Ω occurs
with a probability ρω . In scenario ω, we denote user i’s load
profile as P ω,li = {Pω,li [t], ∀t ∈ T } and his renewable profile
as P ω,ri = {Pω,ri [t], ∀t ∈ T }. Each user will report a set of the
threshold decisions (explained in detail later in Algorithm 1)
5Such a generalization can be supported by the works [31] and [32],
which propose a control framework for the general energy storage system
by aggregating other energy resources, e.g., demand responses in addition to
the physical energy storage.
6Since the focus of our work is on the design of the virtual storage sharing
framework, we have initially chosen to assume that users can perfectly predict
their renewable generations and loads. We include the discussions about the
impact of uncertainties on the users’ decisions in the online Appendix N [11].
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Fig. 2: Decision making over two timescales.
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Fig. 3: Two-stage optimization.
in each operational scenario to the aggregator. Based on users’
reported information, the aggregator makes the investment and
pricing decisions over the investment horizon by considering
the expected profit over the scenarios.
Furthermore, note that the aggregator’s decision and users’
decisions in two stages are coupled. On the one hand, the
aggregator’s virtual storage pricing will affect the users’
decisions of virtual storage, and the aggregator’s invested
physical storage size will constraint the aggregated charge and
discharge decisions of users. On the other hand, the aggregated
charge and discharge decisions of users will determine the
aggregator’s operation of the physical storage. Such a coupled
two-stage problem needs to be solved through backward in-
duction. Thus, in the next two subsections, we will first explain
users’ model in Stage 2 and then explain the aggregator’s
model in Stage 1.
A. Stage 2: User’s model
1) User’s power scheduling in each operational horizon:
Given the price q of the virtual capacity, user i decides the
virtual capacity xωi and the corresponding power scheduling
(as illustrated in Figure 4). We then explain the power schedul-
ing in time slot t. Assume that user i has locally generated
renewable energy Pw,ri [t]. He decides the amount of self-used
renewable energy pω,r,ui [t] that will serve his load or charge
into his virtual storage. He sells back the remaining renewable
energy Pω,ri [t] − pω,r,ui [t] to the grid.7 User i can purchase
the amount of energy pω,gi [t] from the grid. Part of energy
pω,gi [t] may serve his own load, and the remaining part will be
7We assume that users only feed in the unused locally-generated renewable
energy to the grid. We do not consider the feed-in power from the storage to
the grid, which may complicate users’ decisions.
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Fig. 4: Users’ power scheduling.
charged into his virtual storage.8 Finally, user i can discharge
the amount of energy pω,disi [t] from his virtual storage to serve
his load. To balance the power, we can express user i’s energy
purchase from the grid in time slot t as follows:
pω,gi [t] = P
ω,l
i [t]− pω,r,ui [t]− pω,disi [t] + pω,chi [t]. (2)
If a user has no renewables, the charged energy is only from
the purchase from the grid, i.e., pω,r,ui [t] = 0 in (2). We denote
pω,gi = {pω,gi [t],∀t ∈ T }, pω,r,ui = {pω,r,ui [t],∀t ∈ T },
pω,chi = {pω,chi [t],∀t ∈ T }, and pω,disi = {pω,disi [t],∀t ∈ T }.
User i’s charge and discharge decision should satisfy the
constraint of the virtual capacity:
eωi [t] = e
ω
i [t− 1] + ηcpω,chi [t]− pω,disi [t]/ηd, ∀t ∈ T , (3)
0 ≤ eωi [t] ≤ xωi , ∀t ∈ T ′, (4)
eωi [0] = e
ω
i [T ]. (5)
We let eωi = {eωi [t], ∀t ∈ T ′} denote the energy level in the
storage over the operational horizon, where T ′ = {0}⋃ T
and eωi [0] denotes the initial energy level. Since the user’s
storage is virtual, we allow user i to optimize eωi [0] in each
operational horizon. We let ηc and ηd denote the virtual charge
and discharge efficiency rate respectively. We assume that the
aggregator enforces the same virtual efficiency rate as the
physical one. We model the charge and discharge efficiencies
for the physical storage (e.g., Li-ion batteries) as constant
values. Such an assumption has been widely used in the
literature (e.g., [2] [14]) and can capture the key characteristics
of energy loss during the charging and discharging process.
Constraint (5) ensures the independent operation of the virtual
storage across operational horizons [35]. Other power-related
variables are constrained as follows:
pω,gi [t] ≥ 0, pω,chi [t] ≥ 0, pω,disi [t] ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T , (6)
0 ≤ pω,r,ui [t] ≤ Pω,ri [t], ∀t ∈ T . (7)
2) User’s net cost in each operational horizon: Each user
minimizes his net cost in each operational horizon. The cost
includes the payment for the virtual capacity and the electricity
bill. The revenue is from selling back the renewable energy.
Specifically, given the virtual storage price q, over the
operational horizon of scenario ω, user i’s payment to the
aggregator for purchasing the capacity xωi is C
s
i (x
ω
i ) = qx
ω
i .
The electricity bill for the consumption from the grid is
8We assume that users can have an extra meter and wires to connect the
renewable generators to the grid. Hence, it is technically feasible for a user
to sell back the renewable energy to the grid while consuming energy from
the grid.
Cei (p
ω,g
i ) = pib
∑
t∈T
pω,gi [t] + pip max
t∈T
pω,gi [t], (8)
and we can substitute the variable pω,gi [t] from (2) and
denote the electricity bill as Cei (p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i ). User
i’s revenue of selling back renewable energy is
Rri (p
ω,r,u
i ) = pis
∑
t∈T
(Pω,ri [t]− pω,r,ui [t]). (9)
Thus, the net cost in the operational horizon of scenario ω is
Csi (x
ω
i ) + C
e
i (p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i )−Rri (pω,r,ui ). (10)
We then formulate user i’s Problem UPωi that minimizes the
net cost in the operational horizon of scenario ω as follows.
Stage 2: User i optimization problem UPωi
min Csi (x
ω
i ) + C
e
i (p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i )−Rri (pω,r,ui )
s.t. (2), (3)− (7),
var: xωi ,p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i , e
ω
i ,
where the price q is determined by the aggregator in Stage
1. We denote the optimal solution to Problem UPωi by(
xω∗i (q),p
ω,r,u∗
i (q),p
ω,ch∗
i (q),p
ω,dis∗
i (q), e
ω∗
i (q)
)
. Note that
the aggregator sets the same price for all users without any
price discrimination, and each user i makes his own purchase
decision to minimize his cost by solving Problem UPωi .
Therefore, if the virtual storage can bring higher revenues to
some users (e.g., those who have more renewable energy), then
these users have higher demands and purchase more virtual
capacities (than the users who benefit less using the storage).
In this sense, our business model is fair for all users.
B. Stage 1: Aggregator’s model
In Stage 1, at the investment phase, the aggregator decides
the unit price q of the virtual capacity, as well as the capacity
X and power rating P of the physical storage.
1) Aggregator’s power scheduling over each operational
horizon: Each user decides the charge and discharge profiles
(as in Stage 2) and then reports them to the aggregator. The
aggregator aggregates these charge and discharge decisions
and obtains the net charge pω,cha (q) = {pω,cha [t], ∀t ∈ T }
and discharge pω,disa (q) = {pω,disa [t], ∀t ∈ T } as follows:
pω,cha [t](q) =
[∑
i∈I
pω,ch∗i [t](q)−
∑
i∈I
pω,dis∗i [t](q)
]+
, (11)
pω,disa [t](q) =
[∑
i∈I
pω,dis∗i [t](q)−
∑
i∈I
pω,ch∗i [t](q)
]+
, (12)
∀t ∈ T , ∀ω ∈ Ω, where we define [f ]+ = max{f, 0}.
Note that (11) and (12) ensure that pω,cha [t](q) and p
ω,dis
a [t](q)
cannot be positive at the same time, i.e., the physical storage
cannot be charged and discharged simultaneously.
The aggregator can use the physical storage and additional
resources to satisfy users’ requirement. We denote the charge
and discharge requirement served by the physical storage as
pω,ch,sa = {pω,ch,sa [t],∀t ∈ T }, pω,dis,sa = {pω,dis,sa [t],∀t ∈
T }. Similarly, we denote the charge discharge and require-
ment supported by the additional resources as pω,ch,aa =
{pω,ch,aa [t], ∀t ∈ T }, pω,dis,aa ={pω,dis,aa [t], ∀t ∈ T }. They
satisfy the following constraints for users’ demand:
6pω,ch,sa [t] + p
ω,ch,a
a [t] = p
ω,ch
a [t](q),∀t ∈ T ,∀ω ∈ Ω, (13)
pω,dis,sa [t] + p
ω,dis,a
a [t] = p
ω,dis
a [t](q),∀t ∈ T ,∀ω ∈ Ω. (14)
The aggregator’s charge and discharge scheduling is con-
strained by the physical storage size as follows:
eωa [t] = e
ω
a [t− 1] + ηcapω,ch,sa [t]− pω,dis,sa [t]/ηda,
∀t ∈ T ,∀ω ∈ Ω, (15)
γminX ≤ eωa [t] ≤ γmaxX,∀t ∈ T ′,∀ω ∈ Ω, (16)
pω,ch,sa [t] ≤ P, pω,dis,sa [t] ≤ P,∀t ∈ T ,∀ω ∈ Ω, (17)
eωa [0] = e
ω
a [T ],∀ω ∈ Ω. (18)
We let eωa = {eωa [t],∀t ∈ T ′} denote the energy level in
the physical storage. We let ηca and η
d
a denote the charge and
discharge efficiency rate respectively. The fraction coefficients
γmin and γmax correspond to the minimum and maximum
energy levels that can be stored in the storage, respectively.
Constraint (18) ensures the independent operation of storage
in each operational horizon.9
2) Aggregator’s profit over the investment phase (scaled
in one operational horizon): Over the investment phase, the
aggregator bears the storage capital cost which includes the
capacity cost and power rating cost [2]. In each operational
horizon, the aggregator obtains the revenue from selling the
virtual capacity but also bears the operational cost of the
physical storage and additional resources.
Specifically, the capital cost Ccapa (X,P ) over the invest-
ment phase (scaled into one operational horizon) is:
Ccapa (X,P ) = κc
XX + κcPP, (19)
where the coefficient cX and cP are the unit cost of the capac-
ity and power rating over the investment phase, respectively.10
The coefficient κ is the scaling factor that is illustrated in the
online Appendix L [11].
The expectation of the revenue Rva(q) of selling the virtual
storage capacity over all scenarios is
Rva(q) = Eω∈Ω[q
∑
i∈I
xω∗i (q)] =
∑
ω∈Ω
ρωq
∑
i∈I
xω∗i (q). (20)
The expectation of the storage operational cost
Copa (p
ω,ch,s
a ,p
ω,dis,s
a ) over all scenarios is∑
ω∈Ω
ρωcs
∑
t∈T
(pω,ch,sa [t] + p
ω,dis,s
a [t]), (21)
where cs is the unit cost of the charge and discharge, which
models the cost of degradation of the storage. We adopt the
linear cost model that is widely used in the literature [35] [36].
The expected operational cost of additional resources
Cada (p
ω,ch,a
a ,p
ω,dis,a
a ) over all scenarios is∑
ω∈Ω
ρω
∑
t∈T
(ccap
ω,ch,a
a [t]+c
d
ap
ω,dis,a
a [t]), (22)
9We assume that the aggregator can adjust the initial energy level of the
storage by purchasing or selling the energy with the same price through an
external market. Since the storage operational constraint in (18) restricts the
terminal level to be equal to the initial level, the total adjustment and its cost
is negligible in the long run. In addition, the case where the initial energy
level is fixed can be viewed as a special case of our problem.
10Here we consider a single type of storage technology for the central
storage. We can easily generalize this model to incorporate multiple types.
where cca is the unit cost of absorbing users’ charge demand
and cda is the unit cost of acquiring the energy to support users’
discharge demand.
Thus, the aggregator’s expected profit over the investment
phase, scaled into one operational horizon, is
Rva(q)− Ccapa (X,P )− Copa (pω,ch,sa ,pω,dis,sa )
− Cada (pω,ch,aa ,pω,dis,aa ). (23)
The aggregator’s power scheduling is determined by price q
and investment decisions X and P . Thus we denote the oper-
ational cost of storage and additional resources as functions of
(q,X, P ) respectively, i.e., Copa (q,X, P ) and C
ad
a (q,X, P ).
3) Aggregator’s pricing: We consider two pricing strategies
for the aggregator: the optimal-profit price (OP price) and the
lowest-nonnegative-profit price (LNP price). The OP price
maximizes the aggregator’s profit, and the LNP price is the
minimal price that keeps the aggregator’s profit nonnegative.
The latter is reasonable when the aggregator is regulated and
required to provide the most benefit for users. We formulate
Problem AOP to obtain the OP price q? as follows. Due to the
page limit, we enclose all the discussions about the problem
of the LNP price ql in the online Appendix J [11].
Stage 1: Aggregator’s Optimal-profit Price Problem (AOP)
max Rpfa :=R
v
a(q)−Ccapa (X,P )−Copa (q,X, P )−Cada (q,X, P )
s.t. (11)− (14), (15)− (18),
var: q,X, P.
IV. SOLVING TWO-STAGE PROBLEM
The two-stage problem is challenging to solve due to its
non-convex nature. To solve the problem, we first characterize
the properties of each user’s optimal solution (in Stage 2)
under a fixed price q in Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, and then
incorporate users’ decisions into Stage 1 to characterize the
properties of the aggregator’s profit in Proposition 3. Based on
the properties of Stage 2 (in Proposition 1 and Theorem 1) and
Stage 1 (in Proposition 3), we propose Algorithm 1 to solve the
two-stage problem, which determines the aggregator’s optimal
pricing and investment decisions.
A. Solution of Stage 2
For Stage 2, we first prove that the optimal capacity xω∗i (q)
that user i purchases is stepwise in price q. Then we add a
small penalty on the user’s cost to solve the issue of multi-
optima of the charge and discharge decision. We show that the
user’s optimal decision has a simple stepwise structure over
price q as the penalty approaches zero.
1) Stepwise structure of xω∗i (q): The optimal capacity
xω∗i (q) is stepwise over price q as shown in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 (Stepwise property of virtual capacity). The
optimal capacity xω∗i (q) of Problem UP
ω
i is a non-increasing
and stepwise correspondence of the price q. Specifically,
there exists the set of Kωi + 1 threshold prices Qωi =
{qω0i , qω1i , qω2i , ..., q
ωKω
i
i } and 0 = qω0i < qω1i < · · · < q
ωKω
i
i ,
such that xω∗i (q) is given by
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Fig. 5: (a) User i’s optimal capacity xω∗i (q); (b) Revenue Rva(q).
xω∗i (q) =

xω0i , q ∈ (qω0i , qω1i ),
xω1i , q ∈ (qω1i , qω2i ),
...
x
ωKω
i
i , q ∈ (q
ωKω
i
i ,∞),
(24)
where xω0i > x
ω1
i > · · · > x
ωKω
i
i = 0. For any threshold
price qωki > 0, x
ω∗
i (q) can be any value in [x
ωk−1
i , x
ωk
i ]. For
qω0i = 0, x
ω∗
i (q) can achieve any value in [x
ω0
i ,∞). We denote
user i’s optimal capacity set as Xωi = {xω0i , xω1i , ..., x
ωKω
i
i }.
We illustrate Proposition 1 in Figure 5(a). As price q
increases, the optimal capacity that a user purchases decreases.
If the price is higher than the threshold q
ωKω
i
i , the user will
purchase none. Between two adjacent threshold prices, the
optimal capacity remains the same. In the online Appendix
C [11], we prove Proposition 1. In the Appendix D [11], we
present Algorithm 3 for computing the sets Xωi and Qωi .
2) Solving multi-optima problem: Although we have char-
acterized a user i’s optimal capacity decision in Proposition 1,
we still face the difficulty of multi-optima. More specifically,
even at a fixed optimal capacity xω∗i (q), there may still be
multiple virtual charge and discharge solutions
(
pω,chi ,p
ω,dis
i
)
(the set of which is denoted as
(
P ω,ch∗i (q),P
ω,dis∗
i (q)
)
)
that lead to the same net cost to the user. As a result, the
aggregator’s cost is not well-defined, because the cost is due to
users’ charge and discharge demand. To address this difficulty,
we introduce a small positive penalty coefficient ε on the users
net cost in Problem UPωi as follows:
Cqi (p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i ) = ε
∑
t∈T
((pω,chi [t])
2 + (pω,disi [t])
2). (25)
After including penalty (25) to the objective function
of Problem UPωi , we obtain a new modified problem
denoted as UPPωi , which is a quadratic programming
problem. We denote the optimal solution to Problem UPPωi as(
xω?i (q, ε),p
ω,r,u?
i (q, ε),p
ω,ch?
i (q, ε),p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε), e
ω?
i (q, ε)
)
for any price q > 0 and penalty ε > 0. Proposition 2 below
shows such a solution of Problem UPPωi is unique, which
is proved in Appendix E [11]. To ensure users’ unique
decisions, we let the aggregator choose q > 0 and ε > 0.11
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness). For any ε > 0 and any q > 0,
the optimal solution to Problem UPPωi is unique.
11Note that when q = 0, even when we set ε > 0, users can purchase an
arbitrarily large capacity beyond their minimum needs because they bear no
capacity costs.
3) Asymptotic solution: Later in Section B-3, we will
choose a small ε to obtain a near-optimal solution for Stage
1. Intuitively, when ε approaches zero, one would expect that
the solution to Problem UPPωi approaches the solution to
Problem UPωi . Since the optimal charge and discharge decision
of Problem UPωi has multiple optima, it would seem that the
same difficulty will persist as ε approaches zero. Surprisingly,
we show below that the limit of the solution to Problem UPPωi
exists and can be uniquely determined as ε approaches zero.
Theorem 1 (Asymptotic solution). For any price q /∈ Qωi (as
defined in Proposition 1), as ε approaches zero,
(a) there is a unique limit of the optimal charge and discharge
decision
(
pω,ch?i (q, ε),p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
)
. This limit belongs to the
set
(
P ω,ch∗i (q),P
ω,dis∗
i (q)
)
, i.e.,
lim
ε→0+
(
pω,ch?i (q, ε),p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
)∈(P ω,ch∗i (q),P ω,dis∗i (q)),
and it remains constant for all prices within each threshold
price interval (qωki , q
ωk+1
i ), where q
ωk
i , q
ωk+1
i ∈ Qωi ;
(b) the optimal capacity xω?i (q, ε) approaches the optimal
solution xω∗i (q) (given in Proposition 1) with ε = 0, i.e.,
lim
ε→0+
xω?i (q, ε) = x
ω∗
i (q).
Theorem 1(a) is highly non-trivial due to multiple optimal
solutions
(
pω,ch∗i (q),p
ω,dis∗
i (q)
)
of Problem UPωi . We prove
Theorem 1(a) based on the Maximum Theorem [37] by show-
ing the uniqueness of the optimal objective value of Problem
UPωi , and prove Theorem 1(b) by showing the uniqueness of
xω∗i (q). We present the detailed proof in Appendix G [11].
Based on Theorem 1(b), we can compute the limit
limε→0+ xω?i (q, ε) by the optimal solution x
ω∗
i (q) of Problem
UPωi , which takes discrete values from the set Xωi defined in
Proposition 1. Then, given each element in Xωi , we can solve
optimization problems (by Algorithm 4 of Appendix H [11])
that minimize the penalty term to obtain the limiting optimal
charge and discharge decision as ε approaches zero. In other
words, the limiting optimal charge and discharge solution is
a function of each element in Xωi . The above results show
that as ε approaches zero, the user’s solution in Stage 2 has a
stepwise structure, which can be efficiently computed.
B. Solution of Stage 1
Based on the asymptotic structure of the users’ decisions
in stage 2 as shown in Theorem 1, we further analyze the
structure of the aggregator’s optimal profit as a function of
price q as ε approaches zero. We propose an algorithm to
derive the near-optimal profit price qˆ? by considering ε that is
small enough. We use a similar method to compute the LNP
price and present it in Appendix J [11].
1) The optimal profit given (q, ε): Given (q, ε), the ag-
gregator can vary the investment X and P to optimize her
profit as follows. First, the aggregator can compute the rev-
enue Rva(q, ) as in (20) with x
ω∗
i (q) replaced by x
ω?
i (q, ε).
Second, given users’ optimal charge and discharge decision(
pω,ch?i (q, ε),p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
)
,∀i, ω, the aggregator can solve
Problem CO to compute her optimal cost Ca(q, ε) as follows.
CO:Ca(q, ε):=min Ccapa (X,P )+C
op
a (q,X, P )+C
ad
a (q,X, P )
s.t. (11)− (14), (15)− (18),
var: X,P.
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Fig. 6: (a) Cost Ca(q) ; (b) Revenue Rva(q) and profit Rva(q)−Ca(q).
This is a linear programming problem, which can be solved
efficiently using the simplex method [38]. Finally, we compute
the optimal profit for any given (q, ε) by
Rpfa (q, ε) = R
v
a(q, )− Ca(q, ε). (26)
2) The limit of the optimal profit as ε approaches zero: In
Proposition 3 below, as ε approaches zero, we first show in
part (a) that the revenue Rva(q, ε) approaches a limit R
v
a(q) as
in (20) without ε. We further show in (b) that the optimal cost
Ca(q, ε) approaches a limit Ca(q), which is stepwise over the
threshold price set Qa =
⋃
i,ω Q
ω
i . Finally, we show in (c)
that the optimal profit Rpfa (q, ε) approaches R
v
a(q) − Ca(q)
denoted as Rpfa (q) as ε approaches zero. We present the proof
of Proposition 3 in Appendix I [11].
Proposition 3 (Asymptotic profit). For any q /∈ Qa, we have
(a) lim
ε→0+
Rva(q, ε) = R
v
a(q), (b) lim
ε→0+
Ca(q, ε) = Ca(q),
where Ca(q) denotes the optimal value of Problem CO given
the limit of each user i’s optimal charge and discharge deci-
sion
(
limε→0+(p
ω,ch?
i (q, ε), limε→0+ p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
)
,∀i, ω,
(c) lim
ε→0+
Rpfa (q, ε) = R
v
a(q)− Ca(q) , Rpfa (q).
Based on Proposition 1, the revenue Rva(q) is piecewise
linear over the threshold price set Qa as depicted in Figure
5(b): The revenue increases linearly from each threshold price
and then decreases vertically at the next adjacent threshold
price. The slopes of Rva(q) over different price intervals are
determined by
∑
ω ρ
ω
∑
i x
ω∗
i (q). The limiting cost Ca(q) is
a stepwise function over the threshold price set Qa as shown
in Figure 6(a). Hence the limiting profit Rpfa (q) is a piecewise
linear function of price q as shown in Figure 6(b) with multiple
local optima.12 Finally, based on each user i’s limiting decision
limε→0+ xω?i (q, ε) and limε→0+
(
pω,ch?i (q, ε),p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
)
in Theorem 1, we can compute the limiting revenue Rva(q),
the limiting cost Ca(q), and thus the limiting profit Rpfa (q) as
in Lines 2-8 in Algorithm 1 below.
3) The algorithm to compute the near-OP price qˆ?: The
above results demonstrate important solution structures of
Stage 2 and Stage 1 as ε goes to zero. Unfortunately, the
aggregator cannot choose ε = 0 (which has the multi-optima
problem as mentioned in Section A). Thus, below we propose
an iterative procedure in Algorithm 1 (i.e., Lines 9-16) for
computing a sufficiently small ε so that (i) it is close enough to
12Although in Proposition 3 these limiting values are only defined for q /∈
Qa, we can use the left-handed limits of Rpfa (q) as the function values for
q ∈ Qa. In this way, the function Rpfa (q) is well-defined for all q.
the above limit, and (ii) the near-OP price qˆ? can be efficiently
computed. Specifically, first, the aggregator computes the left-
handed limit of profit Rpfa (q) at each threshold price qa ∈ Qa,
and selects the price qma that achieves the global optimum
(Line 9). Second, since profit Rpfa (q) is linearly increasing
over each threshold price interval, the aggregator chooses
a near-OP price qˆ? slightly lower than qma such that the
profit Rpfa (qˆ
?) approximates the maximum profit Rpfa (q
m
a )
within the given accuracy err1 (Lines 10-11). Finally, the
aggregator chooses a small ε in an iterative fashion so that
the profit Rpfa (qˆ
?, ε) approximates Rpfa (qˆ
?) within the given
accuracy err2 (Lines 12-16), where each user solves the
quadratic programming problem UPPωi in each iteration.13
After computing the near-OP price qˆ? and ε, we can obtain the
near-optimal investment decision by Subroutine 1 accordingly.
Algorithm 1 is scalable in terms of the number of users and
scenarios. On the users’ side, they compute their decisions
in parallel, which will not increase the execution time as
the number of users increases. On the aggregator’s side, she
searches the threshold price set for the maximum profit, where
the number of threshold prices is simply linear in the product
of the number of users and the number of scenarios. Therefore,
the execution time of Algorithm 1 is proportional to the
number of users and scenarios, and thus scales well.
V. NUMERICAL STUDY
We simulate a system based on realistic data where users
have diverse load and renewable profiles. We demonstrate that,
as long as there are groups of users with diverse load and
renewable profiles, our virtualization model can promote more
efficient use of the physical storage, offer flexibility to users
in the choices of virtual capacities, and reduce users’ costs
compared with the case where users acquire their own physical
storage.
A. Simulation setup
1) Parameters: We consider the lithium-ion battery as the
energy storage technology. We use realistic load data from
PG&E Corporation in 2012 [40] to characterize users’ load
profiles, and we use wind speed and solar radiation data from
Hong Kong Observatory [41] to characterize users’ renewable
generations. To illustrate how our storage virtualization model
works, we simulate a system as in Figure 1 with three users of
different types. Type-1 user owns the local wind generation,
while Type-2 and Type-3 users own solar panels (with the
same capacity).14
We obtain the one-year historical data, namely 366 scenarios
for users’ load and renewable profile jointly. As a large
13The quadratic programming problem can be efficiently solved by the
interior point method [39].
14Though the installation of wind turbines faces geographical restrictions,
technological innovations (such as vertical axis wind turbines) have promoted
the adoption of wind energy for households, commercial building, and
residential communities [6] [42] [43]. Therefore, to capture a more complete
picture of renewable energy deployment in practice, we consider both solar
energy and wind energy in our simulation. We also conduct the simulations
where Type-1 user has no renewable energy while Type-2 and Type-3 users
have solar energy (with details in Appendix M [11]), which shows that our
framework still works well for significantly reducing the invested physical
storage capacity and the cost of users with solar energy.
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Fig. 7: 7 typical load and renewable generation scenarios for (a) Type-1 user; (b) Type-2 user; (c) Type-3 user.
Algorithm 1 Search of the near-optimal-price qˆ?
1: initialization: set iteration index k = 0, ε0 > 0, relative
error err1 and err2;
2: for user i ∈ I in parallel do
3: Compute the set Qωi and Xωi by Algorithm 3
of Appendix D [11], and compute the limiting
charge/discharge decision by Algorithm 4 of Appendix
H [11], ∀ω ∈ Ω;
4: Report the computation results to the aggregator;
5: end for
6: for each qa ∈ Qa =
⋃
i,ωQωi do
7: The aggregator computes the left-handed limit of profit
Rpfa (qa) = R
v
a(qa) − Ca(qa), with Rva(qa) computed
by (20) and Ca(qa) computed as in Proposition 3(b);
8: end for
9: The aggregator searches the threshold price set Qa and
chooses the price qma ∈ Qa that maximizes Rpfa (q);
10: The aggregator calculates the slope slp(qma ) of R
pf
a (q)
over the threshold price interval (qm−1a , q
m
a ):
slp(qma ) =
∑
ω
ρω
∑
i
xω∗i
(
qm−1a + q
m
a
2
)
;
11: The aggregator computes a price qˆ? (lower than qma ) such
that Rpfa (qˆ
?) approximates Rpfa (q
m
a ) within the relative
error err1:
qˆ? = qma −
Rpfa (q
m
a )err1
slp(qma )
;
12: repeat
13: k := k + 1;
14: εk = εk−1/10;
15:
(
Rpfa (qˆ
?, εk), X(qˆ?, εk), P (qˆ?, εk)
)
=CU(qˆ?, εk);
16: until
Rpfa (qˆ
?, εk)−Rpfa (qˆ?)
Rpfa (qˆ?)
≤ err2;
17: output:
(
qˆ?, εk, P (qˆ?, εk), X(qˆ?, εk)
)
;
number of scenarios lead to a high computational complexity,
we choose a smaller subset of 7 typical scenarios that can
approximate the original scenario set as shown in Figure 7:
Type-1 user has the peak load around noon (typical for some
commercial users) and produces more wind power at night;
Type-2 and Type-3 users have the peak load in the morning and
evening (typical for residential users), and their solar power
reaches peak supply around noon. For more details regarding
Subroutine 1 Communication unit CU(q, ε)
1: input: (q, ε) announced by the aggregator;
2: for each user i ∈ I in parallel do
3: Solve Problem UUPωi given (q, ε), and reports to the ag-
gregator the optimal decisions of xωi (q, ε), p
ω,ch
i (q, ε),
pω,disi (q, ε), for all ω ∈ Ω;
4: end for
5: The aggregator determines the investment decision
X(q, ε), P (q, ε) by solving Problem CO, and computes
the profit Rpfa (q, ε) by (26);
6: output: (Rpfa (q, ε), X(q, ε), P (q, ε));
the data of renewable generation and load, we include them
in the online dataset [44]. For other parameters of electricity
bill and energy storage, we present them in Appendix K [11].
Note that we do not make any assumptions on the correlation
between users’ load profiles and renewable generations; we
just select an example with three types of users for illustration.
Furthermore, since our framework for virtual energy storage
sharing is general, interested readers can also use their own
data as inputs to examine the performance of the framework.
2) Benchmark: To show the performance of our virtual-
ization model, we consider a benchmark where each user
invests in a physical storage product (e.g., Tesla Powerwall) by
himself. He will optimize the (fixed) capacity of the physical
storage, and can only use his own storage over the investment
phase. Apart from the capacity cost, each user also bears the
power rating cost and the operational cost by himself. Each
user i’ solves an optimization problem BMi to minimize his
cost and determines the storage size over the investment phase.
We present the details of Problem BMi in Appendix K [11].
3) Storage price: For the benchmark problem, we consider
2 different storage prices for users as follows:
• Production cost cp(cxu, c
p
u): Users pay the same storage
production cost as the aggregator.
• Retailer price cr(cxu, c
p
u): Users pay a higher storage
retailer price than the aggregator.
The production cost indicates the minimal cost for users to
acquire the energy storage, and the retailer price is a more
realistic price for users to purchase the storage on the market.
The simulation is implemented using MATLAB 2015 on a
computer with an Intel Core i7 of 3.6 GHz and 8 GB memory.
The execution time is about 13s.
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Fig. 8: (a) Physical capacity and virtual capacity from ql to q?; (b)
Users’ charge and discharge decisions.
B. Simulation results
We demonstrate several key benefits of our virtualization
business model as follows.
1) More efficient use of storage: We show that our model
can lead to more efficient use of energy storage, such that the
aggregator can invest in a smaller physical storage capacity to
support much larger virtual capacity allocation.
Figure 8(a) shows the comparison between the aggregator’s
invested physical capacity and the sold expected virtual ca-
pacity when the price varies from the LNP price ql to the OP
price q?. The sold virtual capacity is always much larger than
the actual physical size. Specifically, compared with the virtual
capacity, the physical capacity is reduced by 42.5% at the price
ql and 54.3% at the price q?. To understand this, in Figure
8(b), we show the virtual charge and discharge profiles of
three types of users (represented by different colors) in seven
scenarios (shown as the seven curves for each type of user).
For each curve, the positive value part corresponds to charging
the virtual storage, and the negative value part corresponds to
discharging the virtual storage. We can see that that Type-
1 user discharges the storage around noon to serve his peak
load and charges the storage around morning and night. On
the other hand, Type-2 and Type-3 users charge the storage
around noon to store excessive solar energy and discharge
around morning and night to serve their peak loads. Therefore,
these users’ charge and discharge profiles can partially cancel
out at the aggregated level, which reduces the need of the
physical storage. We also see from Figure 8(a) that the sold
virtual capacity and invested physical capacity decrease with
the price since a higher storage price generally reduces users’
requirement for storage.
2) Purchasing flexible virtual capacity: We show that
our model enables users to purchase flexible capacities over
different operational horizons. To demonstrate this benefit, we
compare users’ cost under two cases as follows:
• Case 1: Users purchase flexible virtual capacities over
different scenarios, as in the proposed framework
• Case 2: Users purchase capacities that cannot change in
different scenarios.
Case 1 corresponds to the user’s Problem UPωi in our
virtualization model. Case 2 is similar to the user’s benchmark
problem BMi except that in Case 2 users will only pay for
the capacity without paying for the power rating cost and
operational cost. This may make the comparison between Case
1 and Case 2 more fair. To illustrate the benefits of flexibility in
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Fig. 9: (a) One-week load and renewable profiles of Type-1 user;
(b) Cost reduction in Case 1 compared with Case 2.
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Fig. 10: Aggregator’s profit and users’ cost from ql to q?.
choosing virtual capacities, we focus on the realistic load and
renewable generation data of Type-1 user in one week (from
2012.10.1 to 2012.10.7), as shown in Figure 9(a). We compare
the user’s cost during this week in both cases under the same
storage price, and show the cost reduction (in percentage) in
Case 1 compared with Case 2 in Figure 9(b). We can see
that when the storage price is very low, the cost reduction
is small since the user pays little for energy storage in both
cases. When the storage price is very high, the user will not
purchase storage and the cost reduction will be zero. The gain
can be as high as 17% when the price is medium.
3) Benefits of reducing users’ cost: In Figure 10, we show
how the users’ cost and the aggregator’s profit change from the
LNP price ql to the OP price q?. In Figure 8, we show users’
cost reduction in our model compared with the benchmark
under the price ql and q?.15
In Figure 10, we see that both the aggregator’s profit and
the users’ total cost increase as the price increases from ql
to q?. The LNP price ql gives the aggregator a zero profit,
meanwhile leaves the most benefits to users. The OP price
q? gives the aggregator maximum profit at the expense of the
maximum cost of users.
We then show each user’s cost reduction in our virtualization
model compared with the benchmark in Figure 11. At the
LNP price ql in Figure 11(a), a user’s cost can be reduced
by up to 34.7% compared with the benchmark where the user
affords retailer price cr, and the cost reduction can still be
up to 18.2% if the user pays the production cost cp in the
benchmark. At the OP price q? as shown in Figure 11(b), the
user’s cost reduction is not significant (up to 8.8%) if the user
pays the production cost cp in the benchmark. This result is
15We also numerically demonstrate in Appendix P [11] that our storage
virtualization model not only helps users cut their electricity bill but also
leads to a peak load reduction in the system.
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Fig. 11: (a) Cost reduction at ql; (b) Cost reduction at q?.
natural, as the OP price maximizes the aggregator’s profit at
the expense of the users’ benefit. Nonetheless, compared with
the user’s cost in the benchmark when user affords the retailer
price cr, the user’s cost can still be reduced by up to 27.2%.
Furthermore, as shown in figures, Type-1 user obtains higher
cost reduction than Type-2 and Type-3 users. The intuition is
that Type-1 user has higher renewable penetration and high
load, which increases the demand for the storage.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a pricing-based virtual storage sharing
scheme among a group of users. An aggregator invests and op-
erates the physical energy storage and virtualizes the physical
storage into separable virtual capacities, which can be sold to
serve different users. We formulated a two-stage optimization
problem for the interaction between the aggregator and users.
Simulation results showed that energy storage virtualization
can save investment in physical energy storage by 54.3% and
reduce users’ costs by up to 34.7%, compared with the case
where users utilize their own physical storage.
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APPENDICES
The appendices below provide the proofs of our main
results, as well as algorithms and simulation setup used in
the main body of the paper. Specifically, Appendix A provides
equivalent reformulations of Problems UPωi and UPP
ω
i , which
allows us to apply results in Appendix B from parametric
linear programming. The results in Appendices A and B will
be used to in Appendix C for the proof of Proposition 1 as well
as in Appendix D for Algorithm 3. Furthermore, Appendix
F introduces the Maximum Theorem, which will be used in
Appendix G for the proof of Theorem 1 as well as in Appendix
I for the proof of Proposition 3. Based on the proof of Theorem
1 in Appendix G, we present Algorithm 4 in Appendix H.
In addition, we prove Proposition 2 in Appendix E. We give
the formulation and the solution method for finding the zero-
profit price in Appendix J. We present the simulation setup in
Appendix K and the daily capital recovery factor in Appendix
L. In Appendix M, N, and P, we show more simulation results
based on the simulation settings in Section V of the main text.
In Appendix M, we conduct simulation for the case where one
user has no renewable generation while the other two users
have solar energy. In Appendix N, we conduct simulation to
discuss the impact of the uncertainty of the load and renewable
generation on users’ decisions. In Appendix P, we numerically
demonstrate that our storage virtualization model can lead to
a peak load reduction in the system. Finally, in Appendix O,
we refer to a residential load dataset to show the diversity of
load profiles in a local community.
APPENDIX A: EQUIVALENT FORM OF STAGE-2
OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Note that the original Problem UPωi of Stage 2 has the
max-function maxt{pω,gi [t]} in its objective function. We first
transform it into an equivalent linear programming problem,
so that we can use results for parametric linear programming
in Appendix B. Towards this end, we introduce an auxiliary
variable pω,mi := maxt{pω,gi [t]}. Further, we eliminate the
variable pω,gi by substituting Equation (2). As a result, Problem
UPωi is equivalent to
min qxωi + pib
∑
t∈T
(−pω,disi [t] + pω,chi [t])
+ pipp
ω,m
i + (pis − pib)
∑
t∈T
pω,r,ui [t]
s.t. (3), (4), (5), (7),
0 ≤ Pω,li [t]− pω,r,ui [t]− pω,disi [t] + pω,chi [t],
∀t ∈ T , (27)
Pω,li [t]− pω,r,ui [t]− pω,disi [t] + pω,chi [t] ≤ pω,mi ,
∀t ∈ T , (28)
0 ≤ pω,chi [t], 0 ≤ pω,disi [t],∀t ∈ T , (29)
var: xωi , p
ω,m
i ,p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i , e
ω
i .
We denote the optimal solutions to Problem UPωi un-
der a given price q as
(
xω∗i (q), p
ω,m∗
i (q),p
ω,r,u∗
i (q),
pω,ch∗i (q),p
ω,dis∗
i (q), e
ω∗
i (q)
)
.
Similarly, by introducing the auxiliary variable pω,mi :=
maxt{pω,gi [t]} and eliminating the variable pω,gi via Equation
(2), we can rewrite Problem UPPωi into a quadratic program-
ming problem as follows. Such a reformulation is equivalent
to the original problem, and is easier to analyze due to the
elimination of the term maxt{pω,gi [t]}.
min qxωi + pib
∑
t∈T
(−pω,disi [t] + pω,chi [t]) + pippω,mi +
(pis − pib)
∑
t∈T
pω,r,ui [t] + ε
∑
t∈T
((pω,chi [t])
2 + (pω,disi [t])
2)
s.t. (3), (4), (5), (7), (27), (28), (29),
var: xωi , p
ω,m
i ,p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i , e
ω
i .
In the later analysis, we will let the penalty coefficient ε
approach zero. Thus, Problem UPPωi will approach the linear
programming problem UPωi that is a linear programming prob-
lem. We denote the optimal solutions to Problem UPPωi under
a given price q and parameter ε as
(
xω?i (q, ε), p
ω,m?
i (q, ε),
pω,r,u?i (q, ε), p
ω,ch?
i (q, ε), p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε), e
ω?
i (q, ε)
)
.
For the later analysis of the problem of Stage 2, we will
focus on these two equivalent problems.
APPENDIX B: CONCLUSIONS OF PARAMETRIC LINEAR
PROGRAMMING
For later proof and analysis, we will use Lemma 1 for
parametric linear programming [45], as introduced below.
Consider the following set of linear programming problems
L2(φ) parameterized by φ, where b and β are constant vectors.
L2(φ) : z(φ) := min c
Tx
s.t. Ax = b+ φβ,
x ≥ 0.
Note that the right-hand-side of the constraint changes with φ.
Based on the results of parametric linear programming [45],
we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1: The optimal value of the objective function z(φ) in
Problem L2(φ) is a continuous, piecewise linear, and convex
function of the parameter φ. Furthermore, the number of
transition points of the function z(φ) is finite.
Lemma 1 lays the foundation for the later analysis of the
linear programming problem UPωi in Stage 2 as proposed in
Appendix A.
Note that when φ = 0, L2(φ) reduces to the following linear
programming problem, denoted as L1:
L1 : min c
Tx
s.t. Ax = b,
x ≥ 0.
The corresponding dual problem of Problem L1 is DL1:
DL1 : max b
Ty
s.t. ATy + s = c,
s ≥ 0.
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Later in Appendix D, we will present the algorithm for
computing the transition points of L2(φ) based on the problem
L1 and its dual problem DL1 according to [45].
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We divide the proof Proposition 1 into 3 stages: (a) we first
show that xω∗i (q) is a non-increasing function of the price q;
(b) we then prove that there exists an upper bound of xω∗i (q);
(c) finally, we show that xω∗i (q) is a stepwise function of the
price q.
A. The optimal capacity xω∗i (q) is non-increasing in price q.
Recall that the optimal capacity xω∗i (q) is the solution to
Problem UPωi under a given price q. We now show that when
the price q increases from q1 to q2 > q1, any increased capacity
xω∗i (q1) + ∆x (with any ∆x > 0) is a worse solution for q2
compared with the original solution xω∗i (q1).
First, we analyze user i’s optimization problem UPωi as
shown in Appendix A by tentatively fixing the variable xωi .
This leads to a new optimization problem UPω,Li (xωi ) as
follows:
fi(x
ω
i ) := min pib
∑
t∈T
(−pω,disi [t] + pω,chi [t])
+ pipp
ω,m
i + (pis − pib)
∑
t∈T
pω,r,ui [t] (30)
s.t. (3), (4), (5), (7), (27), (28), (29),
var: pω,mi ;p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i ; e
ω
i ,
where fi(xωi ) denotes the optimal value of problem
UPω,Li (xωi ) under the parameter xωi , i.e., user i’s minimal
electricity bill by utilizing the storage capacity xωi .
Second, for any price q1, recall that the capacity xω∗i (q1) is
the optimal solution to problem UPωi given the price q1. For
any ∆x > 0, let us consider Problem UPω,Li (xω∗i (q1) + ∆x),
whose objective function is fi(xω∗i (q1) + ∆x). Since x
ω∗
i (q1)
is the optimal solution to Problem UPωi given the price q1,
fi(x
ω∗
i (q1)) + q1x
ω∗
i (q1) must be the optimal objective value
of Problem UPωi under the price q1. Therefore, for any other
xω∗i (q1) + ∆x, the overall cost can only be higher. Thus, we
have
fi(x
ω∗
i (q1)) + q1x
ω∗
i (q1)
≤ fi(xω∗i (q1) + ∆x) + q1(xω∗i (q1) + ∆x). (31)
Note that (q2 − q1)xω∗i (q1) ≤ (q2 − q1)(xω∗i (q1) + ∆x) due
to q2 > q1 and ∆x > 0. Adding this inequality to both sides
of (31), we have
fi(x
ω∗
i (q1)) + q2x
ω∗
i (q1)
≤ fi(xω∗i (q1) + ∆x) + q2(xω∗i (q1) + ∆x). (32)
This means that at the higher price q2, for any ∆x > 0, the
capacity xω∗i (q1) + ∆x increases user i’s cost and is a worse
solution than xω∗i (q1).
Therefore, the optimal capacity will not increase with the
price q.
B. There exists an upper bound on the capacity xωi that user
i will purchase given any price.
To prove this statement, for any price, we first find a
lower-bound for the optimal value fi(xωi ) (which represents
the electricity bill) in Problem UPω,Li (xωi ) as defined in the
previous sub-section. Then, based on Lemma 1, we show that
the function fi(xωi ) is non-increasing and piecewise linear.
Finally, we can show that there exists a maximum capacity
xω0i beyond which user i can not benefit more under any price
q.
Towards this end, suppose that Problem UPωi has been
solved at a given price q. Based on the constraints (3) and
(5), we have ∑
t∈T
(ηcpω,chi [t]− pω,disi [t]/ηd) = 0. (33)
Since 0 ≤ ηc ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ηd ≤ 1, we obtain∑
t∈T
(pω,chi [t]− pω,disi [t]) ≥ 0. (34)
Due to the constraints (28) and (34), we have
pω,mi ≥
∑
t∈T
(Pω,li [t]− pω,r,ui [t]− pω,disi [t] + pω,chi [t])/T
≥
∑
t∈T
(Pω,li [t]− pω,r,ui [t])/T. (35)
Based on the constraints (7) and (35), we further have
pω,mi ≥
∑
t∈T
(Pω,li [t]− Pω,ri [t])/T. (36)
Substituting (34) and (36) into (30), we have
fi(x
ω
i ) ≥ pippω,mi + (pis − pib)
∑
t∈T
pω,r,ui [t]
≥ pip
∑
t (P
ω,l
i [t]− Pω,ri [t])
T
+ (pis − pib)
∑
t∈T
Pω,ri [t],
which shows that fi(xωi ) is lower bounded.
Then, we can show that the function fi(xωi ) is non-
increasing because the increased xωi relaxes the constraint (3)
in Problem UPω,Li (xωi ). We can also show that fi(xωi ) is a
piecewise linear function with a finite number of transition
points according to Lemma 1.
Finally, the above properties (i.e., the existence of the
lower bound, the non-increasing piecewise linearity, and the
finite number of transition points of fi(xωi )) imply that the
slope of the piecewise function fi(xωi ) will be zero if the
virtual capacity goes beyond a threshold xω0i . Otherwise,
fi(x
ω
i ) cannot be lower-bounded. Therefore, user i’s maximum
capacity to purchase is bounded by xω0i since acquiring more
capacity will not reduce his electricity bill fi(xωi ).
C. The optimal capacity xω∗i (q) is a stepwise correspondence
in price q.
We next show that the optimal capacity xω∗i (q) is a stepwise
correspondence in price q. To this end, we analyze the minimal
electricity bill fi(xωi ) under the capacity x
ω
i compared with the
virtual storage cost qxωi .
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Specifically, since the objective of Problem UPωi is equiva-
lent to
min
xωi
min
pω,mi ,p
ω,r,u
i ,
pω,chi ,p
ω,dis
i ,e
ω
i
pib
∑
t∈T
(−pω,disi [t] + pω,chi [t])
+ pipp
ω,m
i + (pis − pib)
∑
t∈T
pω,r,ui [t] + qx
ω
i ,
we can further rewrite the objective as follows:
min
xωi
fi(x
ω
i ) + qx
ω
i . (37)
We have that fi(xωi ) is a continuous, non-increasing, piece-
wise linear convex function with xωi according to Lemma 1.
Furthermore, we have shown that there exists a maximum
capacity xω0i beyond which the electricity bill fi(x
ω
i ) cannot
be further reduced. Therefore, the function fi(xωi ) can be
expressed as follows:
fi(xi) =

− qωKωii xi + s
ωKω
i
i , xi ∈ [x
ωKω
i
i , x
ωKω
i
−1
i ),
− qωKωi −1i xi + s
ωKω
i
−1
i , xi ∈ [x
ωKω
i
−1
i , x
ωKω
i
−2
i ),
...
− qω0i xi + s0i , xi ∈ [xω0i ,∞),
(38)
where q
ωKω
i
i > q
ωKω
i
−1
i > · · · > qω0i = 0 and xω0i >
xω1i > · · · > x
ωKω
i
i = 0. We denote the set of slopes of
the piece-wise function as Qωi = {qω1i , · · · , q
ωKω
i
−1
i , q
ωKω
i
i },
and the set of threshold points of the function as Xωi =
{xω0i , xω1i , · · · , x
ωKω
i
−1
i , x
ωKω
i
i }. Both sets of Qωi and Xωi are
finite based on Lemma 1.
Finally, for the objective function (37), by comparing the
slopes of the electricity bill fi(xωi ) and the storage cost qxi
with respect to xωi , we obtain the optimal solutions x
ω∗
i (q) of
Problem UPωi as follows:
xω∗i (q) =

xω0i , q ∈ (0, qω1i ),
xω1i , q ∈ (qω1i , qω2i ),
...
x
ωKω
i
i , q ∈ (q
ωKω
i
i ,∞),
(39)
and for any q = qωki ∈ Qωi , x∗i (q) can be any value in the set
[x
ωk−1
i , x
ωk
i ].
Based on Section C.A, C.B and C.C in this appendix, we
have Proposition 1 proved.
APPENDIX D: THE ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE SETS Qωi
AND Xωi
We design Algorithm 3 to compute the set of threshold
prices Qωi and the set of optimal capacities Xωi stated in
Proposition 1.
We first present Subroutine 2 that is used in Algorithm
3. First, recall that we have defined the linear programming
problem L1, its dual problem DL1, and the parametric linear
programming problem L2(θ) with the optimal value z(θ) in
Appendix B. For the parametric linear programming problem
L2(φ), we present Subroutine 2 (proposed in Section 4.4
of [45]) to compute the transition points and slopes of the
optimal value z(θ). It is proved (shown in Theorem 34 of
[45]) that Subroutine 2 terminates after a finite number of
iterations. If K is the number of iterations upon termination,
then φ(1), φ(2),...,φ(K) are the successive transition-points
of z(φ) (from the starting parameter φ(0) extending to the
nonnegative part of the real line) with the slope z′(φ(k)) on
the interval (φ(k), φ(k + 1))(1 ≤ k < K). The main idea of
this subroutine is that the domain of z(φ) can be partitioned
in a finite set of linear subintervals such that the dual optimal
set is constant on each linear subinterval. The details about
this subroutine can be found in the paper [45].
Then, based on Subroutine 2, we design Algorithm 3 for
any user i to compute the set of slopes and threshold points
of the optimal value fi(xωi ) of Problem UP
ω,L
i (x
ω
i ), where
the threshold points form the set Xωi and the absolute value
of slopes form the set Qωi . Note that in (38), the slopes of the
optimal value fi(xωi ) are the opposite values of the threshold
prices, which is why there is a negative sign in Step 4.16
Algorithm 3: User i computes the sets Qωi and Xωi
1: Input: the parametric linear programming problem
UPω,Li (xωi );
2: Transform Problem UPω,Li (xωi ) into the form of Problem
L2(φ) and construct the corresponding primal problem L1
and dual problem DL1 without the perturbation parameter
(i.e., xωi = 0);
3: Implement Subroutine 2 Td(UPω,Li (xωi )) = (Z,Φ) to
compute the transition points and slopes;
4: Qωi = −Z , Xωi = Φ;
5: output: (Qωi ,Xωi )
Subroutine 2 Td(L2(φ)) for computing the transition points
and slopes
1: initialization: k = 0; ready:=false; x(0) := x∗
which is an optimal solution of the primal problem L1;
(y(0), s(0)) := (y∗, s∗) which is an optimal solution of
the dual problem DL1; a perturbation vector ∆b.
2: Original slope: Solve z′(φ(k)) = maxy,s{∆bT y : AT y+
s = c, s ≥ 0, sTx(0) = 0};
3: repeat
4: Solve maxφ,x{φ : Ax = b+φ∆b, x ≥ 0, xT s(k) = 0}.
If it is unbounded, ready:=true; otherwise, its optimal
solution is assigned to (φ(k + 1), x(k + 1));
5: Solve z′(φ(k+1)) = maxy,s{∆bT y : AT y+s = c, s ≥
0, sTx(k + 1) = 0}. If it is unbounded, ready:=true;
otherwise, its optimal solution is assigned to (y(k +
1), s(k + 1));
6: k:=k+1;
7: until ready
8: output:(Z,Φ),where Z := {z′(φ(i)), i = 0, 2, ...k − 1};
Φ : {φ(i), i = 0, 2, ...k − 1}.
16Note that in our problem, we will also include the starting parameter
xωi = 0 as the threshold price.
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APPENDIX E: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
To prove Proposition 2, we first prove the uniqueness
of the optimal charge and discharge decisions pω,ch?i and
pω,dis?i . Then, based on the uniqueness of p
ω,ch?
i and p
ω,dis?
i ,
we further show the uniqueness of other optimal decision
variables, i.e., xω?i , e
ω?
i , p
ω,m?
i and p
ω,r,u?
i .
For simplicity of notations, we collect all decision variables
of Problem UPPωi to a vector xωi , i.e., xωi = (xωi , p
ω,m
i ,p
ω,r,u
i ,
pω,chi , p
ω,dis
i , e
ω
i ). We denote the optimal solution to Prob-
lem UPPωi by xω?i (q, ε), and the optimal objective value of
Problem UPPωi by G(xω?i (q, ε)). For simplicity, we use xω?i
to denote xω?i (q, ε) for the later discussion whenever q and ε
are clearly fixed.
A. Uniqueness of the optimal solutions pω,ch?i and p
ω,dis?
i
We first show by contradiction that the optimal decisions
of pω,ch?i and p
ω,dis?
i must be unique. Suppose that there are
two optimal solutions xω?i and xω
′
i , such that there exits a time
slot t making pω,ch?i [t] 6= pω,ch
′
i [t] or p
ω,dis?
i [t] 6= pω,dis
′
i [t].
Since the constraints of Problem UPPωi are convex, we can
construct another feasible solution xω†i = (xω?i + xω
′
i )/2 to
Problem UPPωi . We must have G(xω
′
i ) = G(xω?i ), i.e.,
qxω?i + pib
∑
t∈T
(−pω,dis?i [t] + pω,ch?i [t]) + pippω,m?i
+(pis − pib)
∑
t∈T
pω,r,u?i [t] + ε
∑
t∈T
(
(pω,ch?i [t])
2 + (pω,dis?i [t])
2
)
=qxω
′
i + pib
∑
t∈T
(−pω,dis′i [t] + pω,ch
′
i [t]) + pipp
ω,m′
i
+(pis − pib)
∑
t∈T
pω,r,u
′
i [t] + ε
∑
t∈T
(
(pω,ch
′
i [t])
2 + (pω,dis
′
i [t])
2
)
.
Then we have
G(xω†i )−G(xω?i ) = −ε
∑
t∈T
(
1
2
(pω,ch?i [t]
? − pω,ch†i [t])
)2
− ε
∑
t∈T
(
1
2
(pω,dis?i [t]
? − pω,dis†i [t])
)2
< 0,
which contradicts the assumption that xω?i is optimal. There-
fore, we have pω,ch?i [t] = p
ω,ch′
i [t] and p
ω,dis?
i [t] = p
ω,dis′
i [t],
for any t ∈ T .
B. Uniqueness of the optimal solutions xω?i and e
ω?
i
We next show that the optimal capacity xω?i can be uniquely
determined given the optimal charge and discharge profiles
pω,ch?i and p
ω,dis?
i .
Based on the constraints (3) and (4), we have
eω?i [t] = e
ω?
i [0] + ψ[t], ∀t ∈ T , (40)
0 ≤ eω?i [t] ≤ xω?i , ∀t ∈ T ′, (41)
where we have let
ψ[t] =
t∑
τ=1
(ηci p
ω,ch?
i [τ ]− pω,dis?i [τ ]/ηdi ), ∀t ∈ T . (42)
For constraint (41), eω?i [t] = 0 must be satisfied in some
time slots and eω?i [t] = x
ω?
i must be satisfied in some other
time slots. Otherwise, we can always reduce xω?i to reduce the
cost. Thus, we obtain that
xω?i = max
t∈T
{eω?i [t]} −min
t∈T
{eω?i [t]}
= max
t∈T
{eω?i [0] + ψ[t]} −min
t∈T
{eω?i [0] + ψ[t]}
= max
t∈T
{ψ[t]} −min
t∈T
{ψ[t]} , (43)
with
max
t∈T
{eω?i [0] + ψ[t]} = xω?i , (44)
min
t∈T
{eω?i [0] + ψ[t]} = 0. (45)
Therefore,
eω?i [0] = −min
t∈T
{ψt} . (46)
Since pω,ch?i and p
ω,dis?
i are unique, ψ[t] is also uniquely
determined according to (42). Then, the optimal capacity xω?i
is unique according to (43). The storage level eω?i is also
uniquely determined according to (46) and (40).
C. Uniqueness of optimal solutions pω,m?i and p
ω,r,u?
i
We next show that the optimal solutions pω,m?i and p
ω,r,u?
i
can be uniquely determined given other unique decisions
xω?i ,e
ω?
i , p
ω,ch?
i and p
ω,dis?
i .
For pω,m?i and p
ω,r,u?
i , we have the constraints (28) and (7)
as follows for all t ∈ T :
0 ≤ Pω,li [t]− pω,r,u?i [t]− pω,dis?i [t] + pω,ch?i [t] ≤ pω,m?i ,
0 ≤ pω,r,u?i [t] ≤ Pω,ri [t].
First, given other unique decisions xω?i ,e
ω?
i , p
ω,ch?
i and
pω,dis?i , we can determine the optimal solution p
ω,r,u?
i as
follows. In the objective function of Problem UPPωi , the item
(pis − pib)
∑
t p
ω,r,u?
i [t] is always negative due to pis < pib.
Hence, pω,r,u?i [t] should be as large as possible in order to
reduce the item (pis − pib)
∑
t p
ω,r,u?
i [t] in the objective and
reduce the shaved peak pω,m?i in the constraint (28). Then,
we can show that the optimal solution pω,r,u?i satisfies the
following properties:
• If Pω,li [t] − Pω,ri [t] − pω,dis?i [t] + pω,ch?i [t] ≥ 0, then
pω,r,u?i [t] = P
ω,r
i [t]. Otherwise, if p
ω,r,u?
i [t] < P
ω,r
i [t],
we can always increase pω,r,u?i [t] to reduce user’s cost.
• If Pω,li [t] − Pω,ri [t] − pω,dis?i [t] + pω,ch?i [t] < 0, then
pω,r,u?i [t] = P
ω,l
i [t] − pω,dis?i [t] + pω,ch?i [t]. Otherwise,
if pω,r,u?i [t] < P
ω,l
i [t] − pω,dis?i [t] + pω,ch?i [t], we can
always increase pω,r,u?i [t] to reduce user’s cost. Note that
according to the constraint (27), pω,r,u?i [t] ≤ Pω,li [t] −
pω,dis?i [t] + p
ω,ch?
i [t].
Since pω,ch?i and p
ω,dis?
i are unique and p
ω,r,u?
i is uniquely
determined by pω,dis?i and p
ω,ch?
i as above, it implies that
pω,r,u?i is unique.
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Then, we can show that pω,m?i is uniquely determined by
pω,r,u?i , p
ω,dis?
i and p
ω,ch?
i according to the constraint (28) as
follows:
pω,m?i = min
t∈T
{Pω,li [t]− pω,r,u?i [t]− pω,dis?i [t] + pω,ch?i [t]},
(47)
which implies that the optimal solution pω,m?i is also unique.
Combining the results in Sections D.A, D.B, and D.C of this
appendix, we have proved that the optimal solution xω?i (q, ε)
is unique.
APPENDIX F: THE MAXIMUM THEOREM
For later proof and analysis, we first introduce the Maximum
Theorem in [37] as follows.
Consider the following set of optimization problem MO:
MO : sup
y
f(z,y)
s.t. y ∈ D(z).
Here, z is a parameter chosen from a set Z ⊂ RL, and
y is the variable chosen from a set Y ⊂ RK . Suppose
f : Z × Y → R is a function and D : Z → Y is a non-empty
correspondence that describes the feasibility constraints. For
each z, the problem MO finds the optimal y in D(z) to
maximize f(z,y).
For given z, we denote u(z) as the optimal value of the
objective, i.e.,
u(z) := sup
y∈D(z)
f(z,y),
and we denote S(z) as the solution set, i.e.,
S(z) := {y ∈ D(z) : f(z,y) = u(z)}.
Note that S(·) is a correspondence due to the possibility of
multiple solutions.
The Maximum Theorem : If the function f is continuous
and D is a compact-valued and continuous correspondence,
then we have
1) The objective function u : Z × Y → R is continuous;
2) The solution correspondence S : Z → Y is nonempty,
compact valued, and upper hemi-continuous (u.h.c).
The Maximum Theorem lays the foundation for the later
analysis when we let the penalty coefficient ε approach zero
in Problem UPPωi .
APPENDIX G: PROOFS OF THEOREM 1
For the convenience of the later proof, we first let
vωi = pib
∑
t∈T
(−pω,disi [t] + pω,chi [t])
+ pipp
ω,m
i + (pis − pib)
∑
t∈T
pω,r,ui [t]. (48)
We can write Problem UPPωi as
min qxωi + v
ω
i + ε
∑
t∈T
((pω,chi [t])
2 + (pω,disi [t])
2), (49)
s.t. (3), (4), (5), (7), (27), (28), (29) and (48).
var: xωi , p
ω,m
i ,p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i and v
ω
i .
We can also rewrite Problem UPωi as
min qxωi + v
ω
i , (50)
s.t. (3), (4), (5), (7), (27), (28), (29) and (48).
var: xωi , p
ω,m
i ,p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i and v
ω
i .
For Problem UPPωi of optimizing the objective (49), given
a certain price q and ε, we denote the corresponding optimal
value of vωi as v
ω?
i (q, ε). Similarly, for Problem UP
ω
i of
optimizing the objective (50), given a certain price q, we
denote the corresponding optimal value of vωi as v
ω∗
i (q).
To prove Theorem 1, we will first characterize the limit of
the optimal solutions xω?i (q, ε) as ε approaches zero based
on the Maximum Theorem [37]. Then, we consider the limit
of vω?i (q, ε) as ε approaches zero. Finally, we show the
existence of the right limits of pω,dis?i (q, ε) and p
ω,ch?
i (q, ε)
as ε approaches zero.
A. The limit of xω?i (q, ε) as ε approaches zero
To characterize the limit of xω?i (q, ε) as ε approaches zero,
we will first show that the optimal capacity xω?i (q, ε) of
Problem UPPωi is single-valued over ε ∈ [0, ε¯] given any
q /∈ Qωi and the fixed upper bound ε¯ > 0. Then, based on
the Maximum Theorem, we show that for any q /∈ Qωi , as ε
approaches zero, xω?i (q, ε) approaches the limit x
ω∗
i (q), which
is the optimal capacity of Problem UPωi (i.e.,when ε = 0).
First, given a certain price q and an upper bound ε¯ > 0 ,
for any ε ∈ (0, ε¯], the optimal capacity xω?i (q, ε) of Problem
UPPωi is unique according to Proposition 2. For any price q /∈
Qωi , when ε = 0, the optimal capacity xω∗i (q) of Problem UPωi
is also unique according to Proposition 1. Note that Problem
UPωi is a special case of Problem UPP
ω
i at ε = 0. Hence, we
can simply use xω?i (q, ε) at ε = 0 to represent the solution
xω∗i (q). Thus, for any q /∈ Qωi , the optimal capacity xω?i (q, ε)
is single-valued for any ε ∈ [0, ε¯].
Second, in Problem UPPωi , we can think of the coefficient
ε as the parameter z in Problem MO as defined in the
Maximum Theorem in Appendix F . In order to use the
Maximum Theorem [37], we can verify that Problem UPPωi
satisfies the following conditions: (i) the objective function
is continuous, and (ii) the feasibility constraint, which is a
correspondence of the parameter ε, is compact-valued and
continuous. Therefore, according to the Maximum Theorem
[37], the optimal solution xωi (q, ε) is upper hemi-continuous
in [0, ε¯]. Since the optimal capacity xωi (q, ε) is single-valued
in [0, ε¯] for any q /∈ Qωi , the upper hemi-continuity implies
that xωi (q, ε) is continuous in [0, ε¯]. Further, this continuity
implies that for any q /∈ Qωi , as ε approaches zero, xω?i (q, ε)
approaches the limit xω∗i (q). Note that this implies that the
set Xωi includes all the limiting optimal capacity over each
threshold price interval (0, qω1i ), (q
ω1
i , q
ω2
i )... that are defined
in (39).
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B. The limit of vω?i (q, ε) as ε approaches zero
Similar to the proof of the limit of xω?i (q, ε), to show the
limit of vω?i (q, ε) as ε approaches zero, we will first show that
the optimal v?(q, ε) of Problem UPPωi is single-valued over
[0, ε¯] for any q /∈ Qωi . Then based on the Maximum Theorem,
we show that for any q /∈ Qωi , as ε approaches zero, vω?i (q, ε)
approaches the limit vω∗i (q). Finally, we also show that the
limit vω∗i (q) is stepwise over the threshold price set Qωi .
First, for any ε ∈ (0, ε¯] with fixed ε¯ > 0, and given a
certain price q, the optimal value vω?i (q, ε) of Problem UPP
ω
i
is unique according to Proposition 2. Further, when ε = 0, for
any price q /∈ Qωi , we already have that the optimal capacity
xω∗i (q) of Problem UP
ω
i is unique. Since there must be a
unique optimal value of the objective (50), we obtain that
the optimal value of vω∗i (q) of Problem UP
ω
i is also unique
for any price q /∈ Qωi . Note that Problem UPωi is a special
case of Problem UPPωi at ε = 0. Hence, we can simply use
vω?i (q, ε) at ε = 0 to represent the solution v
ω∗
i (q). Combining
the above discussion, we conclude that, for any q /∈ Qωi , the
optimal value vω?i (q, ε) is single-valued for any ε ∈ [0, ε¯].
Second, similar to the proof of the limit of xω?i (q, ε), in
Problem UPPωi , we regard the coefficient ε as the parameter
z in Problem MO as defined in the Maximum Theorem in
Appendix F . According to the Maximum Theorem [37], the
optimal value vω?i (q, ε) is upper hemi-continuous in [0, ε¯].
Since the optimal value vω?i (q, ε) is single-valued in [0, ε¯] for
any q /∈ Qωi , the upper hemi-continuity implies that vω?i (q, ε)
is continuous in [0, ε¯]. Further, this continuity implies that for
any q /∈ Qωi , as ε approaches zero, vω?i (q, ε) approaches the
limit vω∗i (q).
Third, we show that the optimal value vω∗i (q) is also
stepwise over the threshold price set Qωi . For Problem UPωi ,
we fix the optimal solution xω∗i (q) and regard it as a parameter,
which leads to a new optimization problem Vωi (xω∗i (q)) as
follows.
Problem Vωi (xω∗i (q)):
min vωi
s.t. (3), (5), (7), (27), (28), (29),
0 ≤ eωi [t] ≤ xω∗i (q), ∀t ∈ T ′, (51)
var: pω,mi ,p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i , e
ω
i .
Since xω∗i (q) is stepwise over the threshold price set Qωi , the
optimal value vω∗i (q) also shows the stepwise property over
Qωi .
C. The limit of pω,ch?i (q, ε) and p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε) as ε approaches
zero
To prove this statement, we follow the steps below.
First, we rewrite the optimal solutions pω,ch?i (q, ε) and
pω,dis?i (q, ε) as continuous functions of (x
ω?
i (q, ε), v
ω?
i (q, ε)).
Second, we show the existence of the right limit of(
pω,ch?i (q, ε),p
ω,ch?
i (q, ε)
)
as ε approaches zero based on the
limit of (xω?i (q, ε), v
ω?
i (q, ε)). Finally, we show that the limit
of
(
pω,ch?i (q, ε),p
ω,ch?
i (q, ε)
)
is stepwise over price q.
1) Rewriting the optimal charge and discharge decision
pω,ch?i (q, ε) and p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε) as continuous functions of
(xω?i (q, ε), v
ω?
i (q, ε)): Given certain price q /∈ Qωi and ε > 0,
by fixing the optimal (xω?i (q, ε), v
ω?
i (q, ε)), we can write
Problem UPPωi into Problem CD
ω
i (x
ω?
i (q, ε), v
ω?
i (q, ε)) as
follows.
Problem CDωi (xω?i (q, ε), vω?i (q, ε)):
min
∑
t∈T
((pω,chi [t])
2 + (pω,disi [t])
2)
s.t. (3), (5), (7), (27), (28), (29),
0 ≤ eωi [t] ≤ xω?i (q, ε), ∀t ∈ T ′, (52)
pib
∑
t∈T
(−pω,disi [t] + pω,chi [t]) + pippω,mi
+ (pis − pib)
∑
t∈T
pω,r,ui [t] = v
ω?
i (q, ε) (53)
var: pω,mi ,p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i , e
ω
i .
According to the Maximum Theorem [37], the optimal
solution
(
pω,ch?i ,p
ω,ch?
i
)
is upper hemi-continuous with re-
spect to (xω?i (q, ε), v
ω?
i (q, ε)). Since the optimal solution(
pω,ch?i ,p
ω,ch?
i
)
is unique in Problem CDωi (due to the
strictly convex objective function), we conclude that the op-
timal solution
(
pω,ch?i ,p
ω,ch?
i
)
is continuous with respect to(
xω?i (q, ε), v
ω?
i (q, ε)
)
.
2) The existence of the right limit of the optimal charge
and discharge decision
(
pω,ch?i (q, ε),p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
)
as ε ap-
proaches zero: We have shown in Sections G.A and G.B
of this proof that the optimal solution
(
xω?i (q, ε), v
ω?
i (q, ε)
)
approaches a limit as ε approaches zero for any q /∈ Qωi . Since
the optimal solution (pω,ch?i ,p
ω,dis?
i ) is a continuous function
of
(
xω?i (q, ε), v
ω?
i (q, ε)
)
, we conclude that (pω,ch?i ,p
ω,dis?
i )
also approaches a limit as ε approaches 0+ for any q /∈ Qωi .
Further, this limit can be determined from the solution
of Problem CDωi where we replace (xω?i (q, ε), vω?i (q, ε)) by
their limits (xω∗i (q), v
ω∗
i (q)) as ε → 0+, i.e., from Problem
CDωi (xω∗i , vω∗i ). This also implies that
lim
ε→0+
(
pω,ch?i (q, ε),p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
)∈(P ω,ch∗i (q),P ω,dis∗i (q)),
where that (P ω,ch∗i (q),P
ω,dis∗
i (q)) is the optimal charge and
discharge set under ε = 0 as defined in Section IV.A.2) of the
main text.
3) The stepwise property of the right limit
limε→0+
(
pω,ch?i (q, ε),p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
)
: Since the limit of
the optimal solution
(
xω?i (q, ε), v
ω,m?
i (q, ε)
)
is stepwise
over price q as ε approaches zero and (pω,ch?i ,p
ω,dis?
i )
is continuous in
(
xω?i (q, ε), v
ω?
i (q, ε)
)
, the limit of(
pω,ch?i (q, ε),p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
)
is also stepwise over price
q.
Combining the results in Sections G.A, G.B and G.C of this
appendix, we have proved Theorem 1.
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APPENDIX H: THE ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE LIMIT OF
pω,ch?i (q, ε) AND p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
The analysis in Appendix G also suggests Algorithm
4 that can be used by any user i to compute the
limε→0+(p
ω,ch?
i (q, ε),p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)). The idea is as follows.
Since the optimal solution (pω,ch?i ,p
ω,dis?
i ) is a continuous
function of (xω?i (q, ε), v
ω,m?
i (q, ε)), we will first compute the
limit of (xω?i (q, ε), v
ω,m?
i (q, ε)). Then, we further compute the
limit of
(
pω,ch?i (q, ε),p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
)
.
Algorithm 4: User i computes limε→0+ p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε) and
limε→0+ p
ω,ch?
i [t](q, ε) of scenario ω
1: compute the threshold prices set Qωi and the optimal
capacity set Xωi by Algorithm 3;
2: for each xω∗i ∈ Xωi do
3: solve Problem Vωi (xω∗i ) (presented in Section G.B) and
achieve the corresponding optimal vω∗i ;
4: compute the charge and discharge decision limit
(pω,ch?i ,p
ω,dis?
i ) by solving Problem CD
ω
i (x
ω∗
i , v
ω∗
i )
(presented in G.C);
5: end for
6: output: (pω,dis?i ,p
ω,ch?
i ).
APPENDIX I: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
To prove Proposition 3, the high level intuition is that both
the revenue and the cost of the aggregator are continuous
functions of
(
xω?i (q, ε),p
ch,ω?
i (q, ε),p
dis,ω?
i (q, ε)
)
. Since we
have derived limε→0+
(
xω?i (q, ε),p
ch,ω?
i (q, ε),p
dis,ω?
i (q, ε)
)
,
we can also obtain the limit of the revenue, the cost as well
as the profit of the aggregator as ε approaches zero.
1) The limit of revenue: Since we have proved in Theorem
1 that for any q /∈ Qωi , limε→0+ xω?i (q, ε) = xω∗i (q), we have
lim
ε→0+
∑
ω
ρωq
∑
i
xω?i (q, ε) =
∑
ω
ρωq
∑
i
xω∗i (q).
2) The limit of cost: We first prove that the aggregator’s
cost is a continuous function in ε ∈ (0, ε¯] and its right limit
exists at ε = 0. Then, we show that the cost approaches a
stepwise function as ε goes to zero.
First, for any price q, we have shown in Appendix G that
the optimal solution
(
pch,ω?i (q, ε),p
dis,ω?
i (q, ε)
)
to Problem
UPPωi is a continuous function in ε ∈ (0, ε¯] and its right limit
also exists at ε = 0. Furthermore, for any user i, the aggregate
charge and discharge requirement (pω,cha (q, ε),p
ω,dis
a (q, ε)),
which is determined by (11) and (11), is a continuous func-
tion in
(
pch,ω?i (q, ε),p
dis,ω?
i (q, ε)
)
. Therefore, the aggregate
charge and discharge demand (pω,cha (q, ε),p
ω,dis
a (q, ε)) is a
continuous function with respect to ε ∈ (0, ε¯] and its right
limit exists at ε = 0. For the aggregator’s optimization
Problem CO in Proposition 3(b), the optimal cost Ca is a
continuous function of (pω,cha (q, ε),p
ω,dis
a (q, ε)) according to
the Maximum Theorem [37]. Then, we have that the optimal
cost Ca is a continuous function in ε ∈ (0, ε¯] and its right
limit exists at ε = 0. We can achieve the limiting cost
Ca(q) by computing the optimal objective value of Problem
CO given user i’s limiting charge and discharge decision(
limε→0+ p
ω,ch?
i (q, ε), limε→0+ p
ω,dis?
i (q, ε)
)
, for all i, ω.
Then, in Stage 2, the limits limε→0+ p
ω,ch?
i (q, ε) and
limε→0+ p
ω,ch?
i (q, ε) are both stepwise over the threshold-
price interval (0, qω1i ), (q
ω1
i , q
ω2
i )... as defined in (39). Thus,
in Stage 1, the limits of pω,cha (q, ε) and p
ω,dis
a (q, ε) are also
stepwise over the price set
⋃
iQωi as ε → 0+. According
to the Maximum Theorem [37], the aggregator’s cost Ca is
continuous in (pω,cha (q, ε),p
ω,dis
a (q, ε)), which implies that
as ε → 0+, the total cost also approaches a function that is
stepwise over Qa =
⋃
i
⋃
ωQωi , which is denoted as Ca(q):
Ca(q) =

C0, q ∈ (0, q1a),
C1, q ∈ (q1a, q2a),
...
CKa , q ∈ (qKai ,∞),
where C0, C1, ..CK−1, CKa = 0 are constant.
3) The limit of profit: We characterize the limit of the profit
based on the limits of the revenue and cost as ε approaches
zero.
Since
lim
ε→0+
Rva(q, ε) = R
v
a(q),
lim
ε→0+
Ca(q, ε) = Ca(q),
we have that
lim
ε→0+
Rpfa (q, ε) = lim
ε→0+
(Rva(q, ε)− Ca(q, ε)) = Rva(q)− Ca(q).
APPENDIX J: COMPUTING THE
LOWEST-NONNEGATIVE-PROFIT PRICE
In this appendix, we develop a solution method to compute
the lowest-nonnegative-profit price (LNP price) from the ag-
gregator’s perspective. The lowest-nonnegative-profit price is
defined as the minimal price that keeps the aggregators profit
nonnegative. In Section J.A, we will present the formulation of
Aggregator’s Lowest-nonnegative-profit Price (ALP) problem.
Then, in Section J.B, we will present the solution method,
the main idea of which is similar to the solution method of
computing the optimal-profit price in Algorithm 1. Specifi-
cally, we first characterize the LNP price when ε goes to
zero using the piecewise linear property of the aggregator’s
profit (that has been proved in Proposition 3). Then, due to
the multi-optima problem as we explained in Section IV.A,
the aggregator cannot choose ε = 0. Therefore, we develop
an iterative algorithm in Algorithm 2 to compute a near-LNP
price by adjusting ε, such that the near-optimal solution can
approximate the LNP price in the limiting case within any
given accuracy.
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A. The formulation of Problem ALP
As we briefly introduced in Section III.B of the main body
of our paper, the LNP price is the minimal price that keeps
the aggregator’s profit nonnegative. We can compute the LNP
price by solving Problem ALP as follows.
Stage 1: Aggregator’s Lowest-nonnegative-profit Price
Problem (ALP)17
min
q>0
q s.t. Rpfa (q, ε) ≥ 0.
To solve the LNP price in Problem ALP, we will utilize
the piecewise linear structure of Rpfa (q, ε) when ε approaches
zero. We present the detailed solution method next.
B. The solution method for Problem ALP
In Proposition 3, we have characterized the limiting value of
the aggregator’s profit (when ε approaches zero) as a piecewise
linear function Rpfa (q) in price q (see Figure 6(b)). Based
on this piecewise linear structure, in Subsection 1), we can
efficiently compute the LNP price ql that makes the limiting
profit Rpfa (q) nonnegative. However, this LNP price q
l in the
limiting case cannot be used directly because the aggregator
cannot choose ε = 0. In Subsection 2), we solve a near-LNP
price qˆl under a small ε > 0 to approximate ql within any
given accuracy.
1) The LNP price ql making the limiting profit Rpfa (q)
nonnegative: Our solution method consists of the following
steps. First, considering the fact that the limiting profit Rpfa (q)
is not continuous at each threshold price, we will construct a
correspondence R˜pfa (q) that is well defined at each threshold
price. Second, based on the correspondence R˜pfa (q), we for-
mulate a new problem NALP for solving the LNP price ql
that makes R˜pfa (q) ≥ 0. Third, we analyze the structure of
the LNP price ql and characterize the necessary and sufficient
conditions for computing the LNP price ql. Last but not
least, we present a holistic solution method in Algorithm 2 to
compute the LNP price ql based on the necessary and sufficient
conditions. Next, we provide the details of these steps.
First, we construct a correspondence R˜pfa (q) that is well
defined at each threshold price. Recall in Proposition 3 that
the piecewise linear function Rpfa (q) is discontinuous and
not well-defined at the threshold prices. For any threshold
price qa ∈ Qa, we denote the left-handed limit of Rpfa (qa)
as R˜pfa (q
−
a ) and the right-handed limit as R˜
pf
a (q
+
a ). Then,
we construct a correspondence R˜pfa (q) as follows. For any
threshold price qa, the correspondence R˜pfa (qa) will take
both values of the left-handed limit and right-handed limit,
i.e., R˜pfa (q
−
a ) and R˜
pf
a (q
+
a ).
18 For any price between two
17Note that the LNP price ql must be strictly positive. This is because, when
q = 0, the aggregator’s profit must be strictly negative, i.e., Rpfa (q, ε) < 0,
which contradicts the constraint of Problem ALP. To see this, note that the
aggregator receives no revenue at q = 0, but she still needs to bear the cost of
the physical storage to satisfy users’ demand. Another reason for excluding
q = 0 from the feasible set of Problem ALP is due to the multi-solution issue
related to Proposition 2.
18For the threshold price qa = 0, we only choose the right-handed limit,
such that q > 0 is satisfied.
consecutive threshold prices, i.e., q ∈ (qka , qk+1a ),19 the cor-
respondence R˜pfa (q) is equivalent to R
pf
a (q) which is single-
valued, continuous, and linearly increasing. One example of
the correspondence is shown in Figure 9, where R˜pfa (q) can
take two values at each threshold price.
Second, we formulate a new problem NALP for solving
the LNP price as follows.
Problem NALP : min
q>0
q s.t. R˜pfa (q) ≥ 0.
Note that R˜pfa (q) can take two values at any threshold price qa.
We define that R˜pfa (qa) ≥ 0 is satisfied if either R˜pfa (q−a ) ≥ 0
or R˜pfa (q
+
a ) ≥ 0, i.e., if at least one limit is nonnegative. We
show one example in Figure 11, where the LNP price ql is one
of the threshold prices, with R˜pfa (q
l+) > 0 and R˜pfa (q
l−) < 0.
Third, we characterize the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions to obtain the LNP price ql as follows. Since ql is
the minimal price making R˜pfa (q) ≥ 0, it is necessary and
sufficient to show that i) R˜pfa (q) < 0 for any price q < q
l,
and ii) R˜pfa (q
l) ≥ 0. Recall that the correspondence R˜pfa (q) is
continuous and linearly increasing over any interval (qka , q
k+1
a )
between threshold prices. Thus, we can focus on the limiting
profits at the threshold prices, and consider a total of three
cases for the computation of the price ql. In Case 1, the LNP
price ql strictly lies between two adjacent threshold prices (as
shown in Figure 9). In Case 2 and Case 3, the LNP price ql is
exactly located at one of the threshold prices. The difference
between the latter two cases is that, in Case 2, R˜pfa (q
l) ≥ 0
is satisfied at the left-handed limit with equality (as shown in
Figure 10), while in Case 3, R˜pfa (q
l) ≥ 0 is satisfied at the
right-handed limit but not the left-handed limit (as shown in
Figure 11). These three cases include all the possibilities for
the LNP price ql. Specifically, we summarize the necessary
and sufficient conditions for each case as follows.
• Case 1: The LNP price ql exists between two adjacent
threshold prices, i.e., ql ∈ (qka , qk+1a ), as shown in Figure
9.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for Case 1: i) Both
R˜pfa (q
−
a ) < 0 and R˜
pf
a (q
+
a ) < 0 for any threshold price
qa < q
k+1
a ; ii) for the threshold price q
k+1
a , the left-
handed limit R˜pfa (q
(k+1)−
a ) > 0; iii) R˜pfa (q
l) = 0.
0
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Fig. 9: The LNP price in Case 1
• Case 2: The LNP price ql is exactly one of the threshold
prices and the left-handed limit R˜pfa (q
l−) = 0, as shown
19Recall that the threshold prices are sorted in an increasing order by 0 <
q1a < q
2
a < · · · < qKaa as shown in Figure 6(b).
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in Figure 10.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for Case 2: i) Both
R˜pfa (q
−
a ) < 0 and R˜
pf
a (q
+
a ) < 0 for any threshold price
qa < q
l; ii) the left-handed limit R˜pfa (q
l−) = 0.
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Fig. 10: The LNP price in Case 2
• Case 3: The LNP price ql is exactly one of the threshold
prices, the right-handed limit satisfies R˜pfa (q
l+) ≥ 0, and
the left-handed limit satisfies R˜pfa (q
l−) < 0, as shown in
Figure 11.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for Case 3: i) Both
R˜pfa (q
−
a ) < 0 and R˜
pf
a (q
+
a ) < 0 for any threshold price
qa < q
l; ii) the left-handed limit R˜pfa (q
l−) < 0 and the
right handed-limit R˜pfa (q
l+) ≥ 0.
0
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Fig. 11: The LNP price in Case 3
Finally, we present a search algorithm to compute the LNP
price ql in Algorithm 2 based on the three cases. In Lines
2-6 of Algorithm 2, users compute and report the threshold
prices and capacities to the aggregator. Within the for-loop in
Lines 8-25, we search the threshold price set Qa for the LNP
price in an increasing order. Specifically, we compute the left-
handed and right-handed limits R˜pfa (q
k−
a ) and R˜
pf
a (q
k+
a ) at
each threshold price in Line 10 and Line 12. Then, we will
examine the corresponding profits to determine the LNP price
ql as follows.
• If the condition in Line 13 is satisfied in the kth iteration
in the for-loop of Lines 8-25, the necessary and sufficient
conditions (i) and (ii) of Case 1 will be satisfied, which
implies that the LNP price ql lies in the threshold price
interval (qk−1a , q
k
a). To further satisfy the necessary and
sufficient condition (iii) of Case 1, we execute Subroutine
3.1 in Line 14 and compute the LNP price ql that makes
R˜pfa (q
l) = 0 in Line 3 of Subroutine 3.1, where we utilize
the linear structure over the price interval as shown in
Figure 9.
• If the condition in Line 17 is satisfied in the kth iteration
in the for-loop of Lines 8-25, the necessary and sufficient
conditions (i) and (ii) of Case 2 will be both satisfied for
the threshold price qka . Thus, we attain the LNP price q
l
at the threshold price qka as in Case 2.
• If the condition in Line 21 is satisfied in the kth iteration
in the for-loop of Lines 8-25, the necessary and sufficient
conditions (i) and (ii) of Case 3 will be both satisfied for
the threshold price qka . Thus, we attain the LNP price q
l
at the threshold price qka as in Case 3.
2) The near-LNP price qˆl under a positive ε: Since the
aggregator cannot choose ε = 0 due to the multi-optima
problem as we explained in Section IV.A, we cannot directly
use the LNP price ql in the limiting case where ε approaches
zero. Thus, we propose an iterative procedure in Subroutines
3.1-3.3 of Algorithm 2 (for Cases 1-3, respectively) to compute
a near-LNP price qˆl by adjusting ε, such that i) we can still
utilize the piecewise linear solution structure in the limiting
case; ii) we can compute a near-LNP price to approximate
the LNP price in the limiting case within a given arbitrary
accuracy. Furthermore, after computing the near-LNP price qˆl
and ε, we can compute the investment decision accordingly
by Subroutine 1.
• For Case 1, in Subroutine 3.1, we compute a small ε in
an iterative fashion (by decreasing ε iteratively), such that
Rpfa (q
l, ε) is close to zero within an acceptable accuracy
err4 (in Lines 4-8 of Subroutine 3.1). In this way, we
use the LNP price ql in the limiting case as the near-
LNP price qˆl.
• For Case 2, in Subroutine 3.2, the LNP price ql is attained
at one threshold price qka and R˜
pf
a (q
k−
a ) = 0. Note that
we cannot directly choose the threshold price due to the
discontinuity of R˜pfa (q). Instead, in Subroutine 3.2, since
profit R˜pfa (q) is linearly increasing over (q
k−1
a , q
k
a), we
let the aggregator choose a near-LNP price qˆl slightly
lower than qka , such that the profit R
pf
a (qˆ
l) approximates
the profit R˜pfa (q
k−
a ) within a given accuracy err3 (in
Lines 3-4 of Subroutine 3.2).20 Then, the aggregator
can compute a small ε in an iterative fashion so that
the profit Rpfa (qˆ
l, ε) approximates Rpfa (qˆ
l) within the
accuracy err4 (in Lines 5-9 of Subroutine 3.2).
• For Case 3, in Subroutine 3.3, the LNP price ql is attained
at one threshold price qka and R˜
pf
a (q
k+
a ) ≥ 0. Similar to
Case 2, we cannot directly choose the threshold price due
to the discontinuity of R˜pfa (q). In Subroutine 3.3, since
profit R˜pfa (q) is linearly increasing over (q
k
a , q
k+1
a ), we let
the aggregator choose a near-LNP price qˆl slightly higher
than qka , such that the profit R
pf
a (qˆ
l) approximates the
profit R˜pfa (q
k+
a ) within a given accuracy err3 (in Lines 3-
4 of Subroutine 3.3). Then, the aggregator can compute a
small ε in an iterative fashion so that the profit Rpfa (qˆ
l, ε)
approximates Rpfa (qˆ
l) within the accuracy err4 (in Lines
5-9 of Subroutine 3.3).
20Recall that Rpfa (q) is equivalent to R˜
pf
a (q) at non-threshold prices.
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Algorithm 2: Search of the near-LNP price qˆl
1: initialization: set iteration index k = 0;
2: for each user i ∈ I in parallel do
3: Compute the set Qωi and Xωi by Algorithm 3 of
Appendix D;
4: Compute the limiting optimal charge/discharge decision
corresponding to each element in Xωi by Algorithm 4
of Appendix H, for all ω ∈ Ω;
5: Report all the computation results to the aggregator;
6: end for
7: The aggregator sorts the threshold price setQa =
⋃
i,ωQωi
by an increasing order: 0 = q0a < q
1
a < · · · < qKaa .
8: for k = 0 to Ka do
9: if qka > 0 then
10: The aggregator computes R˜pfa (q
k−
a ) = R
v
a(q
k−
a ) −
Ca(q
k−
a ), where R
v
a(q
k−
a ) is the left-handed limit of
the revenue at qka computed by (20) and Ca(q
k−
a ) is
the left-handed limit of the cost at qka computed by
solving Problem CO as in Proposition 3(b);
11: end if
12: The aggregator computes R˜pfa (q
k+
a ) = R
v
a(q
k+
a ) −
Ca(q
k+
a ), where R
v
a(q
k+
a ) is the right-handed limit of
the revenue at qka computed by (20) and Ca(q
k+
a ) is the
right-handed limit of the cost at q computed by solving
Problem CO as in Proposition 3(b);
13: if R˜pfa (qk−a ) > 0 then
14: The aggregator executes Subroutine 3.1 and com-
putes
(
qˆl, εj , P (qˆl, εj), X(qˆl, εj)
)
= QZint(qka);
15: break;
16: end if
17: if R˜pfa (qk−a ) = 0 then
18: The aggregator executes Subroutine 3.2 and com-
putes
(
qˆl, εj , P (qˆl, εj), X(qˆl, εj)
)
= QZ−(qka);
19: break;
20: end if
21: if R˜pfa (qk+a ) ≥ 0 then
22: The aggregator executes Subroutine 3.3 and com-
putes
(
qˆl, εj , P (qˆl, εj), X(qˆl, εj)
)
= QZ+(qka);
23: break;
24: end if
25: end for
26: output:
(
qˆl, εj , P (qˆl, εj), X(qˆl, εj)
)
;
APPENDIX K: SIMULATION
A. Benchmark
For the benchmark system for comparison, we consider a
system (without virtual storage) where each user invests in a
physical storage product (e.g., Tesla Powerwall) by himself.
He will optimize the (fixed) capacity of the physical storage,
and can only use his own storage during the lifespan of the
storage. Apart from the capacity cost, each user also bears
the power rating cost and the operational cost by himself.
User i solves an optimization problem BMi as follows to
minimize his cost and determines the optimal storage size over
the investment phase.
Subroutine 3.1: QZint(qka) for Case 1
1: input: price qka ;
2: initialization: set iteration index j = 0, ε0 > 0, absolute
error err3 > 0 and err4 > 0;
3: The aggregator computes the near-LNP price qˆl (which is
also the LNP price ql in the limiting case) between the
adjacent threshold prices qk−1a and q
k
a as follows:
qˆl =
qk−1a R˜
pf
a (q
k−
a )− qkaR˜pfa (q(k−1)+a )
R˜pfa (q
k−
a )− R˜pfa (q(k−1)+a )
;
4: repeat
5: j = j + 1;
6: εj = εj−1/10;
7: The aggregator executes Subroutine 1 and computes(
Rpfa (qˆ
l, εj), X(qˆl, εj), P (qˆl, εj)
)
= CU(qˆl, εj);
8: until | Rpfa (qˆl, εj) | ≤ err4;
9: output:
(
qˆl, εj , P (qˆl, εj), X(qˆl, εj)
)
;
Subroutine 3.2: QZ−(qka) for Case 2
1: input: price qka ;
2: initialization: set iteration index j = 0, ε0 > 0, absolute
error err3 > and err4 >;
3: The aggregator calculates the slope slp(qka) of R
pf
a (q)
over the threshold price interval (qk−1a , q
k
a):
slp(qka) =
R˜pfa (q
k−
a )− R˜pfa (q(k−1)+a )
qka − qk−1a
;
4: The aggregator computes the near-LNP price qˆl (smaller
than qka) such that R
pf
a (qˆ
l) is close enough to zero (within
the absolute error err3):
qˆl = qka −
err3
slp(qka)
;
5: repeat
6: j = j + 1;
7: εj = εj−1/10;
8: The aggregator executes Subroutine 1 and computes(
Rpfa (qˆ
l, εj), X(qˆl, εj), P (qˆl, εj)
)
= CU(qˆl, εj);
9: until | Rpfa (qˆl, εj)−Rpfa (qˆl) |≤ err4;
10: output:
(
qˆl, εj , P (qˆl, εj), X(qˆl, εj)
)
;
min
∑
ω
ρω
[
Cei (p
ω,r,u
i ,p
ω,ch
i ,p
ω,dis
i )−Rri (pω,r,ui )
+ cs
∑
t∈T
(pω,chi [t] + p
ω,dis
i [t])
]
+ κcxuxi + κc
p
upi
s.t. (3), (5), (6), (7), ∀ω ∈ Ω;
γminxi ≤ eωi [t] ≤ γmaxxi, ∀t ∈ T ′,∀ω ∈ Ω; (54)
0 ≤ pω,chi [t], pω,disi [t] ≤ pi,∀t ∈ T , ∀ω ∈ Ω; (55)
var: xi, pi, {pω,r,ui ,pω,chi ,pω,disi , eωi ,∀ω ∈ Ω},
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Subroutine 3.3: QZ+(qka) for Case 3
1: input: price qka ;
2: initialization: set iteration index j = 0, ε0 > 0, absolute
error err3 > 0 and err4 > 0;
3: The aggregator calculates the slope slp(qk+1a ) of R
pf
a (q)
over the threshold price interval (qka , q
k+1
a ):
slp(qk+1a ) =
R˜pfa (q
(k+1)−
a )− R˜pfa (qk+a )
qk+1a − qka
;
4: The aggregator computes the near-LNP price qˆl (larger
than qka) such that R
pf
a (qˆ
l) is close enough to R˜pfa (q
k+
a )
(within the absolute error err3):
qˆl = qka +
err3
slp(qk+1a )
;
5: repeat
6: j := j + 1;
7: εj = εj−1/10;
8: The aggregator executes Subroutine 1 and computes(
Rpfa (qˆ
l, εj), X(qˆl, εj), P (qˆl, εj)
)
= CU(qˆl, εj);
9: until | Rpfa (qˆl, εj)−Rpfa (qˆl) |≤ err4;
10: output:
(
qˆl, εj , P (qˆl, εj), X(qˆl, εj)
)
;
where cxu is the unit capacity cost and c
p
u is the unit power
rating cost. For Tesla Powerwall, customers need to pay about
$7000 (including installation fee) for the storage capacity of
14KWh and an extra inverter cost [3]. 21 Compared with
user’s Problem UPωi in our virtualization model, in Problem
BMi each user’s decision of storage capacity xi and power
rating pi are fixed for all scenarios as shown in (54) and (55).
Apart from the capacity cost cxuxi, each user i also bears the
operational cost incurred by the charge decision pω,chi and
discharge decision pω,disi as well as the inverter/converter cost
for the power rating pi.
B. Simulation parameter
We consider the lithium-ion battery as the energy storage
technology. We use realistic load data from PG&E Corporation
in 2012 [40] to simulate users’ load profiles, and we use wind
speed and solar radiation data from Hong Kong Observatory
[41] to calculate users’ renewable generations. To illustrate
our storage virtualization model, we simulate a system with
three users of different types, and choose 7 typical scenarios
to approximate the original scenario set.
We use the electricity price data from [28], which is a
monthly demand charge tariff. However, note that in users’
models, we consider a daily billing period and thus adopt
the daily demand charge tariff. Under a monthly demand
charge tariff, the peak power consumption is charged only once
over 28-31 days (depending on which month is concerned).
21At present, many companies only provide several capacity choices for
consumers. For example, Tesla Powerwall only offers fixed capacity of
13.5KWh to consumers. In benchmark BMi, we let users flexibly determine
the capacity.
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Fig. 12: Type-3 user’s load in a month.
However, in a daily demand charge tariff, the peak power
consumption is charged on each day, and thus 28-31 times
in a month. Therefore, we need to scale down the monthly
peak price to the daily peak price, so that users pay the same
or similar bill under the daily and monthly demand charge
tariff in each month. We note that it is nontrivial regarding
how to scale down and obtain an accurate daily peak price for
users since different users have different daily and monthly
peak load patterns. Instead, for an illustrative purpose, we
calculate the peak price of the daily demand charge tariff in
our simulations as follows. Specifically, we denote the peak
price for the monthly demand charge tariff and daily demand
charge tariff by piMp and pi
D
p , respectively. We denote the peak
power in one month of M days (e.g., 30 days) by pm and the
peak power in each day d by pd, where d = 1, 2, 3, ...,M .
In order to scale piMp to pi
D
p , we argue that users maintain the
same total electricity bill under the daily and monthly demand
charge, i.e.,
M∑
d=1
pdpiDp = p
mpiMp .
Thus, we obtain the scaled-down peak price of the daily
demand charge tariff as
piDp = pi
M
p
pm∑M
d=1 p
d
.
In practice, the daily peak power pd of users in one month
can be similar across days.22 Therefore, for simplicity and
for the illustrative purpose, we consider the case where each
day’s peak power is the same, so we let pd = pm for
all d. By choosing M = 30, we then obtain the scaling
factor p
m∑M
d=1 p
d = 1/30. Thus, we obtain the peak price as
piDp = 0.4$/KW for the daily demand charge tariff based
on the realistic peak price piMp = 10.8$/KW of the monthly
demand charge tariff. Furthermore, although we choose a
daily operational horizon in our model, our framework can
be extended to different timescales of the operational horizon
and billing cycles, e.g., one month.
Therefore, we scale down and obtain the daily peak price
pip at 0.4$/kW. The energy charge price pib is 0.03$/kWh [28].
22In Figure 12, we show the hourly load of Type-3 user in the month of
2012 January (with total 744 hours), where the peak power of each day is
highlighted in red circle. We can see that the daily peak power is similar, and
is around 1.75KW.
23
We set the renewable energy selling price pis at 0.01$/kWh.
For the storage cost, we set the capacity cost cX=160$/KWh,
power rating cost cP=55$/KW, 23 and the operational cost
cs = 0.001$/kWh [35]. For other technical parameters of the
storage, we set efficiency rates ηc = ηd = ηca = η
d
a = 0.95,
and the effective capacity rate γmin = 0.9, γmax = 1 [2]. For
the additional resources, we set ccha = 0 and c
dis
a = 0.1$/KWh
[49]. We choose a sufficiently small penalty coefficient ε =
3× 10−7$/(kWh)2.
In addition, our optimization framework is applicable to
any parameter configuration of the system. Interested users
can also use other parameter values of the system to test the
performance of our framework.
APPENDIX L: THE DAILY CAPITAL RECOVERY FACTOR κ
The aggregator’s investment cost is
Ccapa (X,P ) = κc
XX + κcPP.
Note that in practice cX and cP are given as unit costs over
an investment phase of several years. Here, we scale them into
the operational horizon of one day by the daily capital recovery
factor κ. For the factor κ, we first calculate the present value
of an annuity (a series of equal annual cash flows) with the
annual interest rate r, and then we divide the annuity equally
to each day. This leads to the formulation of the factor κ as
follows [50],
κ =
r(1 + r)y
(1 + r)y − 1 ·
1
Yd
, (56)
where y is the number of years over the total time horizon,
and Yd is the number of days (e.g., 365) in one year.
APPENDIX M: SIMULATION OF THE CASE WITHOUT WIND
ENERGY
We conduct the simulations where one user has no renew-
able generation and the other two users have solar energy. It
can be another common case in practice especially for some
areas that are unsuitable to install wind turbines. Recall that
we consider three types of users with seven scenarios in the
simulation part of Section V: Type-1 user has the wind energy
while Type-2 and Type-3 users have solar energy. In this part,
we conduct the simulation for the case where Type-1 user
has no wind energy while Type-2 and Type-3 users have solar
energy. For the parameter setup, we keep the parameters of the
load and renewable generation the same as the setup in Section
V except that Type-1 user has no wind energy. In Figure 13,
we show the seven scenarios of load and renewable generation
for Type-1 user (without wind), Type-2 user and Type-3 user,
respectively.
We can show that at the optimal-profit price q?, the invested
physical capacity is reduced by 35% compared with the
sold virtual capacity. In Figures 14(a) and 14(b), we also
show users’ cost reduction in our model compared with the
benchmarks (where users install their own physical storage at
23The lithium-ion battery production cost is estimated from 145$/KWh to
227$/KWh [46] [47] [48] in 2017.
the production cost cp and the market price cr, respectively)
under the price ql and q?. Type-2 and Type-3 users’ costs can
be reduced by up to 20.4%, while Type-1 user’s cost can only
be reduced by up to 3.1%. This shows that even though there
is no wind energy considered for Type-1 user, our model can
still work well for significantly reducing the invested physical
storage capacity and reducing the cost of Type-2 and Type-3
users with solar energy. Note that in Section V where Type-
1 user has the wind generation, Type-1 user’s cost can be
reduced by up to 34.7% (instead of 3.1% when he has no wind
generation). This shows that users without renewable energy
may benefit less compared to users with renewable energy in
our framework.
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Fig. 13: 7 typical load and renewable generation scenarios for (a)
Type-1 user (without wind); (b) Type-2 user; (c) Type-3 user.
APPENDIX N: DISCUSSION OF THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE
LOAD AND RENEWABLE GENERATION
Next we discuss the impact of uncertainties of renewable
generations and loads on the virtual storage operation. In
our model, users make purchase decisions on the virtual
capacity as well as the charge and discharge decisions at the
24
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Fig. 14: (a) Cost reduction at ql; (b) Cost reduction at q?.
beginning of each day, based on the prediction of their loads
and renewable generations for the next day. There have been
extensive studies on the prediction of wind power generation
[8], solar power generation [9], and power consumption [51].
Since the focus of our work is on the design of the virtual
storage sharing framework, we have initially chosen to assume
that users can perfectly predict their renewable generations
and loads. Here we further provide the discussions about the
impact of uncertainties in the day-ahead prediction on the
users’ purchase of virtual capacities and their virtual storage
operation.
To study the impact of uncertainties in loads and renewable
generations, we incorporate prediction errors in the simulations
for users’ load and renewable profiles. Recall that we consider
three types of users with seven scenarios in the simulation
part of Section V. For the impact of uncertainties in loads
and renewable profiles, we focus on one type of users and
consider one scenario of the load and renewable profiles
as the benchmark of the day-ahead prediction. Specifically,
we choose Type-2 user of Scenario 1, whose (day-ahead
predicted) load and renewable profiles are shown as the solid
lines in Figure 15. We assume that the prediction error errl
of the load profile is characterized by the uniform distribution
U(−βPω,li [t], βPω,li [t]) over intervals [−βPω,li [t], βPω,li [t]],
where the coefficient β denotes the maximum deviation range
of the error errl. Thus, in the real-time operation, the load
profile is characterized by Pω,li [t] + err
l when considering
the prediction error. Similarly, for the renewable generation,
we assume that the prediction error errr is characterized by
the uniform distribution U(−βPω,ri [t], βPω,ri [t]). Then, in the
real-time operation, the renewable generation is characterized
by Pω,ri [t] + err
r when considering the prediction error.
For the real-time load and renewable profiles, we randomly
generate 50 realizations of the random load Pω,li [t] + err
l
and renewable generation Pω,ri [t] + err
r with β = 10%,
respectively, the maximum deviation ranges (away from day-
ahead prediction) of which are depicted by the dashed lines
in Figure 15.
We first solve the users’ optimization problem UPPωi with
the day-ahead prediction load and renewable generation, and
obtain the optimal decisions of the charge/discharge and the
purchased virtual capacities as a benchmark. Then, given 50
realizations of the real-time load and renewable profiles, we
also solve the users’ optimization problem UPPωi , and obtain
the corresponding optimal decisions of the charge/discharge
and the purchased capacity. We regard the optimal decisions
under the day-ahead predicted profiles as the benchmark. For
the optimal decisions under 50 realizations of the real-time
load and renewable profiles, we show their maximum deviation
from the benchmark in Figure 16.
Specifically, for users’ optimal decisions, we assume that the
aggregator chooses the optimal-profit price p? computed under
the day-ahead prediction. In Figure 16(a), we show the optimal
charge and discharge decision at the price p? under the day-
ahead prediction as the black curve (where the positive values
represent charge and the negative values represent discharge),
and we show the maximum deviations of the optimal decisions
under the prediction error away from the decisions of the
day-ahead prediction as the blue error bars. In Figure 16(b),
we show the optimal purchased virtual capacities from the
price zero to price p? under the day-ahead prediction as the
black curve, and we show the maximum deviations under the
prediction error away from the day-ahead prediction as the
blue error bars.
In Figure 16(a), we can see that, when considering the
prediction error, the whole-day optimal charge and discharge
decisions will not deviate more than 0.3KW compared with the
optimal decisions under the day-ahead prediction. As shown in
Figure 16(b), the optimal purchased capacity considering the
prediction error will not deviate more than 9% compared with
the decisions under the day-ahead prediction. Furthermore, the
cost of Type-2 user under the prediction error of β = 10% is
within the range [47.5, 53.1] cents, with a maximum deviation
of 6% from the minimized cost 49.87 cents under the day-
ahead prediction.
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Fig. 15: Type-2 user’s load and renewable profiles.
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Fig. 16: (a) Type-2 user’s optimal charge and discharge decisions;
(b) Type-2 user’s optimal purchased virtual capacity.
APPENDIX O: DIVERSITY OF USERS’ LOAD PROFILES IN A
LOCALIZED REGION
We refer to the residential load data from [52] and demon-
strate that users’ load profiles can be significantly diverse in
a localized region.
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Fig. 17: Load profiles of four households the Mueller community
of Austin,Texas U.S. [10].
Specifically, we acquired residential load data from [52],
which is provided by the Pecan Street Smart Grid Demon-
stration Program [10]. Over 1000 households in the Mueller
community of Austin, Texas, U.S., participated in the program
and shared their electricity consumption data with the project.
We take the hourly load profiles of four different households
on January 1, 2017 as an illustrative example to show diverse
electricity consumption in Figure 17. We see that Household
1’s load profile is flat across the whole day, but Household
2 has a peak load at late night (around 22:00). In contrast,
the peak load of Household 3 appears in the evening (around
17:00), and the peak load of Household 4 occurs around noon
(around 11:00).
Thus, we see that the electricity consumption of different
households in one community can be considerably differ-
ent. Such different load profiles lead to diverse charge and
discharge decisions of users, which can potentially reduce
the required capacity of the physical storage and save the
investment cost as demonstrated in the simulations in Section
V of the main text of our paper.
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Fig. 18: Net load of (a) Type-1 user; (b) Type-2 user; (c) Type-3
user; (d) the system.
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APPENDIX P: PEAK REDUCTION IN THE SYSTEM
Even though we do not explicitly consider minimizing the
system peak load as the objective in our model, we numerically
demonstrate that the virtual charge and discharge of users not
only helps users cut their electricity bill but also leads to a
peak load reduction in the system
For the purpose of illustration, we depict the results of
the peak-load reduction of individual users and the peak-
load reduction of the system in Figure 18 of this response
letter, considering a three-user system. In Figure 18(a), 18(b)
and 18(c), we show three types of users’ original net daily
load (i.e., load minus the renewable generation) compared
with the net load after utilizing the virtual storage (where
the blue dashed curve corresponds to the optimal-profit (OP)
price q? and the red dotted curve corresponds to the lowest-
nonnegative-profit (LNP) price ql). We see that each user’s
peak net-load is shaved significantly by more than 40%.24
In Figure 18(d), we show the aggregated original system net
load (i.e., aggregated load minus the aggregated renewable
generation of all three users) compared with the aggregated
system net load after utilizing the virtual storage (where the
blue dashed curve corresponds to the OP price q? and the red
dotted curve corresponds to the LNP price ql). We see that the
aggregated peak load of the system in one day is reduced by
41.7% at q? and 44.0% at ql, compared with the system peak
load without virtual storage. Thus, the results shown in Figure
18 demonstrate that our model not only reduces users’ peak
load, but also reduces the system peak, and therefore benefits
the whole system.
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